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ABSTRACT

Two Essays on Public Economics:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
ON POVERTY AND INEQUALITY,
and
THE SECOND BEST SOLUTION TO
THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES’ PROBLEM
by
Cristian F. Sepulveda
March, 2010

Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation consists of two independent essays on public economics. The first essay
studies the consequences of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequalities. We
describe the possible channels through which fiscal decentralization might affect poverty and
income inequalities, and provide a review of the available literature addressing different aspects
of the problem. We also carry out an empirical analysis with data of a large number of countries
at different stages of development, for the period 1971-2000; and conclude that fiscal
decentralization has significant effects on poverty and income inequalities. In particular, fiscal
decentralization helps to reduce poverty as long as the share of sub-national expenditures is not
greater than one third of total government expenditures. Fiscal decentralization can also help to
reduce income inequalities, but only if the general government represents a significant share of

x

the economy (twenty percent or more). These findings are important because they suggest,
contrary to the traditional public finance theory, that sub-national governments can play an
important role in the reduction of poverty and income inequalities.
The second essay studies the second best solution to the public expenditures’ problem. We
revisit the problem of determining the optimal combination of public and private goods in the
presence of a proportional labor income tax. By allowing the tax base to vary with the taxpayers’
behavioral responses to taxation, we derive the “effective” budget constraint faced by a
benevolent and omniscient government, which describes the set of affordable combinations of
public and private goods. We show that the optimal solution to the government problem
corresponds to the point of tangency between the effective budget constraint and the highest
attainable social indifference curve. The traditional normative prescription for public expenditures
under a second-best scenario does not satisfy this condition, and therefore it provides a
suboptimal solution. We also show that under the proposed analytical framework we can predict
the flypaper effect, an empirical regularity that has for long challenged the conventional theory.

xi

1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation consists of two independent essays on public economics, one on the
consequences of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequalities and another on the
second best solution to the public expenditures’ problem.
The first essay analyzes the possible effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and
income inequality. Even though fiscal decentralization, poverty, and the distribution of income
have, separately, been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research. Indeed, most
democracies around the world are by now either decentralized or engaged on fiscal
decentralization reforms. However, there are very few studies analyzing the ways fiscal
decentralization can affect poverty and income inequalities, and we still know very little about the
sign and magnitude of these causal relationships. In this paper we first provide a review of the
available literature addressing different aspects of the problem, and describe the possible channels
through which fiscal decentralization might affect poverty and income inequalities. We
distinguish between direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income
inequalities. We define direct effects as those where poverty or income inequalities are altered by
changes that the fiscal decentralization process impose on public policies or on the behavior of
relevant economic agents. For instance, a movement towards fiscal decentralization will likely
change the tax mix and the composition of public expenditures. In contrast, indirect effects are
defined as those effects of fiscal decentralization in certain socio-economic factors that that in
turn can influence poverty and the distribution of income.
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The paper describes several possible direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization
on poverty and income distribution, and review the existing theoretical and empirical literature to
conclude that the overall or net effect is undetermined. It the end, the effect of fiscal
decentralization on poverty and income inequality would seem to be, essentially, an empirical
question. We carry out an empirical analysis with data of a large number of countries at different
stages of development, for the period 1971-2000; and conclude that fiscal decentralization has
significant effects on poverty and income inequalities. In particular, fiscal decentralization helps
to reduce poverty as long as the share of sub-national expenditures is not greater than one third of
total government expenditures. Fiscal decentralization can also help to reduce income
inequalities, but only if the general government represents a significant share of the economy
(twenty percent or more). These findings are important because they suggest, contrary to the
traditional public finance theory, that sub-national governments can play an important role in the
reduction of poverty and income inequalities.
The second essay is theoretical, and focuses on the problem of determining the optimum
amount of government expenditures in a second best scenario. Our original intention was for this
essay to be a complement of the first one. Our goal was to analyze the relationship between
accountability and revenue collections, and show that governments that are not responsive to
taxpayers’ preferences induce greater non-compliance and, as a consequence, are more limited in
the amount of tax revenues and they are able to collect as well as in their ability to carry out their
expenditure policies. While developing the formal arguments, however, we realized that the
selected theoretical framework, developed by the traditional literature about the marginal cost of
public funds, does not allow us to represent (diagrammatically) the marginal welfare costs of
irresponsive government behavior. An investigation on the causes of this limitation of the
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traditional theory led us to change the focus of this essay, which turned to be the very concept of
the marginal cost of funds, used by the traditional literature to represent the welfare costs of
taxation under a second best scenario where economic distortions are present.
The second essay revisits the problem of determining the optimal combination of public
and private goods in the presence of a proportional labor income tax. By allowing the tax base to
vary with the taxpayers’ behavioral responses to taxation, we derive the “effective” budget
constraint faced by a benevolent and omniscient government, which describes the set of
affordable combinations of public and private goods. We show that the optimal solution to the
government problem corresponds to the point of tangency between the effective budget constraint
and the highest attainable social indifference curve. The traditional normative prescription for
public expenditures under a second-best scenario does not satisfy this condition, and therefore it
provides a suboptimal solution to the public expenditures’ problem. In this essay we formally
characterize the second best solution to the government problem and develop an analytical
framework that allows for the normative and positive aspects of the public expenditures’ problem
to be fully integrated. In order to show this, we use our analytical framework to explain the
flypaper effect, an empirical regularity that has for long challenged the conventional theory. The
flypaper effect is observed whenever a transfer to the government increases public expenditures
more than an equivalent transfer to the individuals in the same jurisdiction. The traditional theory
uses the notion of fiscal illusion to explain this empirical finding, arguing that intergovernmental
taxpayers “confuse” the taxpayers, who misperceive the costs of public goods. In our framework,
however, intergovernmental transfers appear as directly reducing the marginal costs of public
funds, such that the flypaper effect is not the result of confusion or illusion, but instead of a
rational behavioral response to the intergovernmental transfer policy.
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ESSAY I: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION ON POVERTY
AND INEQUALITY

Introduction

After a worldwide movement towards decentralization that has lasted more than thirty years, the
reduction of poverty and inequalities remain as essential policy objectives in most countries, and a
particularly relevant concern in developing economies. However, the effects of decentralization
on poverty and income distribution inequalities have not received much attention in the
economics literature. To date, there has been little theoretical discussion addressing this matter
and the available empirical studies are remarkably scarce.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the potential effects
of decentralization on poverty and inequality. We focus on two main tasks. First, we review the
relevant literature and provide a comprehensive conceptual framework describing the different
channels through which decentralization might affect poverty and income inequality. Second, we
use a panel data set encompassing a large number of countries to estimate the direction and
economic significance of these influences.
Decentralization is not a policy goal per se, but instead a national strategy pursued in
order to reorganize the operation of the public sector and make it more efficient and accountable
to the needs and preferences of the population. However, even though the extent of effective
decentralization can be regarded as a decision variable that is subject to the political process, the
political process itself depends on a wide array of socio-economic and historical factors.

5
Therefore, as in the cases of poverty and income inequality, the observed degree of
decentralization can also be regarded as an outcome reached within the socio-economic
framework where public policies are implemented.
In this context, it is difficult to isolate the potential effects of decentralization as a policy
strategy from other policy strategies, including those of reducing poverty and income inequality.
A first necessary step consists of defining precisely what we mean by these three concepts. In this
paper we focus on fiscal decentralization, as opposed to administrative and political
decentralization, and consequently concentrate our analysis on the effects that the decentralization
of expenditure responsibilities and taxing powers might have on poverty and income inequality.
In turn, both poverty and inequality in income distribution are consistently defined as withincountry phenomena with a national scope. In particular, we focus on the overall level of poverty,
not only on “the poverty of the poorest,” and on the distribution of income among households at
the national level, as opposed to alternative approaches focusing on within sub-national
jurisdiction or inter-regional differences.
Our conceptual framework distinguishes between direct and indirect effects of fiscal
decentralization on poverty and income inequalities. Direct effects are those in which poverty or
income inequalities are altered because of changes that the fiscal decentralization process impose
on public policies or on the behavior of relevant economic agents. For example, a movement
towards fiscal decentralization will likely change the tax mix and the composition of public
expenditures, which in turn might affect tax and expenditure incidence and, in addition, might
induce the migration of individuals searching for better standards of living. In contrast, the
indirect effects are transmitted by a number of socio-economic factors that are likely to be
affected by the fiscal decentralization process, and that in turn can influence poverty and the
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distribution of income. Important examples that have received special attention in the literature
are economic growth and the size of government.
Given the complexity of the linkages between fiscal decentralization, poverty and income
inequality, the identification of the sign and magnitude of the impact of fiscal decentralization
represents a significant challenge, requiring the use of econometric techniques addressing the
issue of reverse causation. Moreover, the results obtained in this exercise might closely mirror the
coherence of fiscal decentralization reforms and depend on whether the reduction of poverty and
income inequality is indeed a public policy priority in each country. At the end, the effect of fiscal
decentralization on poverty and income inequality would seem to be, essentially, an empirical
question. What we hope to accomplish in this paper is to unveil to what degree, on average, fiscal
decentralization processes have contributed to the amelioration, or else aggravation, of poverty
levels and inequality in the distribution of income across a large sample of countries over recent
years. Since many countries, especially those in the developing world, are simultaneously
embarked in active policies involving the reduction of poverty and inequalities, as well as in fiscal
decentralization reforms, it is important to clarify the extent to which these policy strategies are
complementary or do seem to work against each other. For this task, we analyze a panel of
countries at different stages of development with data, arranged in five-year averages, for the
period 1971-2000. In the empirical analysis, we follow the previous literature and measure fiscal
decentralization by the share of sub-national expenditures over total public expenditures.
Similarly, we measure poverty by the headcount ratio, the poverty gap, and the Human
Development Index; and income inequality by the Gini coefficient.
Even though the level of poverty and the relative inequality in the distribution of income
are concepts that are related in several ways, in this paper we opt for analyzing the impact of

7
fiscal decentralization on poverty and inequality separately. We first analyze the effect of fiscal
decentralization on poverty. Our results indicate that this effect is significant and non linear. At
lower levels of fiscal decentralization the impact is to reduce poverty, but higher (“excessive”)
levels of fiscal decentralization can actually work to increase the poverty level. In our sample of
countries, the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty is optimized at the point where subnational expenditures represent approximately one-third of total government expenditures. This
result correspond the net impact of a complex list of direct and indirect effects of decentralization
pulling in different directions, and as such it cannot be easily interpreted. It is as if some level of
decentralization can bring citizens access to basic services instrumental for poverty reduction, but
that at higher levels of decentralization the fiscal resources left at the central level may be too
scarce for implementing effective national anti-poverty programs.
Next, we turn to analyze the effect of fiscal decentralization on income inequality. Our
results show that fiscal decentralization has a statistically significant effect in determining the
extent of income inequalities, but that the sign and magnitude of this effect depends on the overall
size of the government sector within the economy. Given the level of aggregation of our estimates
and the complexity of the direct and indirect effects through which decentralization may affect the
distribution of income, we cannot be sure of how the net effect comes about. But, it is as if for
situations where the share of the government sector is relatively low, under 20 percent,
decentralization works to increase income inequality perhaps because more funds are available to
sub-national governments from more redistributive central government programs. For shares of
the government sector in the economy over 20 percent, fiscal decentralization works to decrease
income inequality, perhaps due to the type of expenditure programs that can be implemented at
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the sub-national level in combination with the fact that central government budgets are large
enough to implement sizable redistributive programs among sub-national governments.
These findings do not necessarily fit well with the traditional normative approach dating
back to Musgrave (1959) about the minimum role to be played by sub-national governments in
redistributive policies. In practice, based on our empirical results for a sample of countries, it
would appear that in a fiscally decentralized economy the sub-national governments can play a
significant role in poverty reduction and the accomplishment of redistributive goals for income
distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the concepts
and measurements of decentralization, poverty and income inequality. In Section 3 we discuss a
conceptual framework and the different channels by which fiscal decentralization can affect
poverty and income distribution. In Section 4 we analyze the previous empirical literature and
identify some of the determinants of poverty and income inequality. In Section 5 we present the
econometric estimations and results. Section 6 concludes.

Decentralization, Poverty and Inequalities: Alternative Concepts and Measurement Issues

Even though fiscal decentralization, poverty and income distribution have been the subjects of
extensive academic research and political debate, the three concepts are very broad and complex,
and there is no consensus about their precise meaning and proper measurement. In this section we
briefly review the most important measures used in the literature for each one of these concepts
and justify our selection of the particular measurements we will use in the analysis. The
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discussion in this section is also utilized to identify more precisely the problems this paper aims to
examine.
The literature describes the concept of decentralization as comprising three different but
interdependent dimensions; the political, the administrative, and the fiscal dimensions.1 Political
decentralization consists of devolving decision making powers to locally elected officials, who
are accountable to their own constituencies. Administrative decentralization refers to the transfer
of decision making powers on planning and management of the public function regarding issues
such as hiring decisions and the setting of salaries. Fiscal decentralization refers to the transfer of
decision making powers over the assignment of revenue-raising authority and expenditure
responsibilities to the sub-national governments. In practice, it is difficult to think of a meaningful
level of fiscal decentralization process without the presence of effective levels of political and
administrative decentralization. As already mentioned, the focus in this paper is on fiscal
decentralization, but to the extent that the other two dimensions of decentralization may be
lacking we should expect more diffused or weaker effects of fiscal decentralization.
A typical concern in the context of empirical analysis is whether the measures of fiscal
decentralization, usually based on accounting executions of the general budgets, can capture the
degree of autonomy or discretion that characterizes the devolution of decision making power to
sub-national governments. The empirical literature has traditionally used the share of sub-national
expenditures (or revenues) over consolidated public expenditures (or revenues) as a proxy for the
degree of fiscal decentralization.2 This share does not provide information on the level of

1

See Rondinelli (1981) for an early discussion on these three dimensions of decentralization.
The share of sub-national expenditures over consolidated public expenditures is usually computed with data from
the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) of the IMF.
2
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expenditures or tax autonomy enjoyed at the sub-national level, and therefore it does not properly
measure the extent of fiscal decentralization. 3
Even though we agree about the limitations associated with this measure of fiscal
decentralization, lacking any better alternative we are forced to follow the empirical literature and
to use the same proxy. With respect to the results of the empirical analysis, however, it is
important to clarify that the meaning of the fiscal decentralization variable refers only to the
extent or “magnitude” of the fiscal decentralization process, not to the effective devolution of
autonomy or “intensity” of the process.
Our approach to the concept of poverty and the subsequent choice of the particular
measure used in the empirical analysis also requires some clarification. The economic literature
usually has focused on measures of poverty that are based on an assumption about the income or
consumption’s threshold. Individuals (or households) are considered poor if their levels of income
or consumption fall below the selected threshold. Given this information, it is possible to compute
the incidence, the depth, or the severity of poverty. The incidence of poverty (headcount index) is
simply the share of the population that is defined as poor. The depth of poverty (poverty gap) is
the sum of the distance between the selected threshold and the level of income or consumption of
each individual, divided by the total population. Finally, the severity of poverty is computed by
adding up the square of the distance between the selected threshold and the level of income or
consumption of each individual, and then dividing by population; in this way the measure of
severity of poverty places a higher weight on those individuals that are further away from the
3

More refined measures of fiscal decentralization exist for a limited number of countries and for an also limited
number of years. OECD (1999) offers a new classification of sub-national tax revenues and computes the values
corresponding to each category for 19 countries in 1995. Stegarescu (2005) extends this database to include 23
OECD countries for the period 1965-2001 for alternative measures of revenue decentralization. See Ebel and Yilmaz
(2003) for a comparison between traditional and improved measures of revenue decentralization in terms of their
explanatory power in a number of decentralization issues. See also Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (forthcoming)
on the power of different measures of decentralization and better and worse approaches to its measurement.
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poverty line.4 These measures of poverty are commonly associated with some problems. First,
these measures are all based on an arbitrary choice of the poverty line; second, they measure
poverty only among the poor; and third, poverty is not necessarily restricted to income and
consumption, but in addition, it might encompass other dimensions like security and opportunities
which might well be restricted for levels of income or consumption that are over the selected
poverty line.
Another problem with these traditional measures of poverty is data availability. In our
empirical analysis we use the headcount ratio and the poverty gap as dependent variables;
however, these variables do not allow for a large sample size. In order to overcome this problem,
in this paper we also use the Human Development Index (HDI) as our measure of poverty. The
HDI has been developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and combines
normalized measures of the population health and longevity, knowledge and education, and
standard of living.5 Of course, an increase in the HDI must be interpreted as a reduction of
poverty, and the index offers several advantages with respect to other common proxies for
poverty, some of which are particularly convenient for the analysis in this paper. The HDI does
not require an arbitrary definition of the poverty line, it refers to the level of development (or
poverty) of the whole population of a country (not only the poor), and it considers alternative
dimensions of well being in addition to income and consumption. In this sense, given that fiscal
decentralization reform is a nationwide process that can affect poverty in a variety of ways, the

4

For a more detailed discussion on poverty concepts and measurement, see, for instance, Lok-Dessallien (2000) and
Coudouel, Hentschel and Wodon (2002).
5
In particular, the population health and longevity are measured by the life expectancy at birth; knowledge and
education by the adult literacy rate and a combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio; and the
standard of living is measured by the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power
parity.
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HDI might be better able to capture the full extent of the effects of fiscal decentralization on
poverty.
The concept of inequality has also been surrounded with measurement problems and
several alternatives have been used in the literature. The most common measure of inequality is
the Gini coefficient, which can be defined in terms of income or consumption, and either for
individuals or households.6 The main problem with the Gini-coefficient is that any (non extreme)
value can represent two or more different distributions of income or consumption, thus it provides
an ambiguous description of any given distribution.7 Another popular measure of inequality is the
Decile Dispersion Ratio (DDR), equal to the ratio of the income or consumption of the richest
10% of the population divided by the income or consumption of the poorest 10% of the
population. The obvious problem with this measure is that it says nothing about the 80% of the
population that is between the richest and poorest deciles.8
In this paper, we follow the most common practice in the literature and use the Ginicoefficient as our proxy for inequality. More in particular, we focus on the observed inequality in
the distribution of income among households, preferably based on surveys representing the whole
population of a country and measuring “disposable” income (as opposed to consumption and
gross income). These choices are justified by the need of a consistent sample of inequality
measures which must be congruent with the nationwide coverage of a fiscal decentralization
process.
6

The Gini coefficient computes the relative size of the area between the Lorenz curve (plotting the share of
population against the cumulative income share) and the egalitarian distribution (a 45° line representing identical
shares for income and population). The Gini coefficient can be defined for a range of values between 0, which
represents perfect equality, and 100, which represent perfect inequality (the whole income in the economy is
concentrated in one single individual).
7
Specifically, the ambiguity problem would not exist (only) in the extreme values of Gini coefficient, defined as
perfect equality at 0, and perfect inequality at 100. At any intermediate value, however, there are countless possible
distributional arrangements that can plausibly lead to any given value of the Gini coefficient.
8
Other measures of income distribution exist, including the Hoover index, the Theil index, etc. See, for example,
Coudouel, Hentschel and Wodon (2002).
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Both poverty and income inequality are common government policy targets and often the
same public policies implemented to reduce one of them will serve to reduce the other. In general,
when poverty is defined in income terms, then any reduction of poverty will, ceteris paribus, also
reduce income inequality. Similarly, assuming that national income remains constant (or is
growing), any reduction in income inequality implies a reduction in poverty. Even though in this
paper we do not limit the concept of poverty to income, we still can expect the relationship
between poverty and income inequality to hold. The improvements of health and education
outcomes captured by the HDI are presumably enjoyed by the poor, who can benefit by
increasing their present and future productivity and thus also their present and future income.
In the next section we describe the channels through which fiscal decentralization can
affect poverty and the distribution of income. We make use of the close relationship between
poverty and inequality in the distribution of income and jointly examine the potential effects of
fiscal decentralization on these two variables.

The Potential Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Poverty and Income Inequality:
A Framework of Analysis

The goal of this section is to outline the main channels by which fiscal decentralization may affect
poverty and the distribution of income. Our objective is to provide a framework of analysis and to
identify the causal relationships and specific factors that should be accounted for in an empirical
model. As we show in this section, the potential channels relating fiscal decentralization to
poverty and income distribution are multiple and lead to complex interactions, so it is virtually
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impossible to anticipate the sign of the net effect of fiscal decentralization on the two variables of
interest.
In Figure 1 we present a schematic summary of the possible channels through which fiscal
decentralization might affect poverty and the distribution of income. The socio-economic
framework represents the context under which fiscal decentralization is implemented and where
public policies and macroeconomic outcomes are determined. The socio-economic framework
consists of, and is defined by, factors like the stage of development of the country and regions,
social norms, the demographic configuration, the political system, markets, and other institutional
arrangements. In turn, these factors jointly determine, and are determined by, the extent and
characteristics of the fiscal decentralization process and other socio-economic outcomes such as
poverty and income inequalities.
In order to identify the potential sources of influences on poverty and income inequality,
we explicitly distinguish among the most characteristic components of a fiscally decentralized
system of government. From a budgetary perspective, expenditures must be equal to the sum of
own taxes and fees, net transfers received, and net borrowings. Any decentralized system operates
under some combination of these four elements of government finances, and each element may
have its own effect on poverty and income distribution.9 Of course, the extent of “true”
decentralization, or the degree of effective autonomy assigned to sub-national governments, will
typically not be the same for each budgetary component. In this sense, the expenditure and
revenue sides of the budget can be distinguished as two separate branches of government policy
and, consequently, expenditure decentralization and revenue decentralization can be regarded as
alternative, but complementary, sources of influences on poverty and income distribution.
9

While borrowing clearly constitutes a type of revenue for any government units, intergovernmental transfers can be
seen as expenditures at the central level or revenues for the local governments. Here, we implicitly follow a local
perspective, and classify intergovernmental transfers as a revenue source.
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Figure 1. Potential effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequality

Socio-economic Framework / Factors
-

Decentralized System of Government
Expenditure Decentralization
National
Expenditures’
Policies

Sub-national
Expenditures

Stage of Development
Social Norms
Political System
Demographic Configuration
Institutional Arrangements
Market Structure and Equilibria
(“Market outcomes” on Poverty
and Income distribution)

(expenditure competition)

Accountability of
government officials

Allocation
efficiency

Revenue Decentralization

-

Indirect effects:
Economic growth and price stability
Regional economic convergence
Size of Government
Institutional Development

Intergovernmental

National (Tax
and) Revenues’
Policies

Transfers

(preferences for
decentralization)

Sub-national
Own Revenues
Sub-national
Borrowings
(tax competition and effort)

-

Poverty and
Income Distribution

Direct effects:
Population and Factor Mobility
Composition of Public Expenditures
Tax and Expenditure Incidence
Public employment

The classic argument by which fiscal decentralization is said to improve social welfare is
provided by Oates (1972) and focuses on public expenditures. Given that under a fiscally
decentralized system the decisions regarding public expenditures are made “closer to the people,”
fiscal decentralization allows for a better fit of their (presumably heterogeneous) preferences and
therefore for unambiguous efficiency gains for society. The decentralization literature also
stresses the important role of own revenue collections in providing the right incentives to the
correct functioning of a decentralized system of government. As long as a significant share of
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local expenditures is financed via own revenue collections the local authorities can effectively
become accountable to their constituents, who are able to correctly evaluate the performance of
local governments and either punish it or award it in the voting process. In turn, this
accountability mechanism serves as an incentive for the local authorities to make efficient
spending decisions. 10
Separately, the decentralization of expenditures and revenues give rise to a variety of subnational government responses. On the expenditure side, sub-national governments might
compete for better bundles of public goods and services in order to keep their tax bases or attract
new taxpayers from other jurisdictions. On the revenue side, inter-jurisdictional competition
might be observed in terms of the tax rates that are applied locally. More generally, local
authorities are faced with a variety of decisions regarding the definition of tax burdens and the
enforcement of their taxes, which ultimately describe the level of tax effort that they are willing to
exert.
Altogether, a movement towards a fiscally decentralized system of government can most
likely alter the functioning of the public sector and potentially reshape the design and
implementation of public policies. Of course, since many expenditure policies have a pro-poor
inception, and tax policies in general can plausibly change the distribution of disposable income
among individuals within a country, then fiscal decentralization has the potential to influence both
poverty and income inequalities.
Here we distinguish between direct and indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on
poverty and income inequality. We define as direct those effects that can be associated either with
a change in the implementation of public policies or with changes in the behavior of relevant
10

In addition, high degrees of revenue autonomy can be effective in introducing more fiscally responsible behavior
among sub-national units and in reducing the common pool problems associated with the predominance of revenue
sharing and transfers as a mode of sub-national finance.
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economic agents due to the decentralization process. As examples of direct effects we consider
the mobility of households and production factors, the composition of public expenditures, tax
and expenditure incidence, and public employment. Note that sub-national governments do not
need to be explicitly involved in the design of redistributive policies in order to impose direct
effects on poverty and inequalities. In contrast, we define as indirect those effects that are
observed “after” the decentralization process has interacted with the socio-economic framework.
The fiscal decentralization process can produce changes on certain macroeconomic outcomes and
institutional arrangements that, in turn, can have their own effect on poverty and the distribution
of income. In these cases, changes in macroeconomic and institutional variables act as
transmission mechanisms between fiscal decentralization and the realization of poverty and
inequality outcomes. Examples of these transmission mechanisms include economic growth, the
size of government, and the development of civil and political institutions.
Finally, poverty and income inequalities can also help to determine, among many other
political and socio-economic factors, the extent to which a country decides to push for the reform
of expenditure and revenues decentralization. For example, in the presence of regional income
disparities the richest regions might be inclined to demand greater expenditure and revenue
autonomy, while poorer regions might prefer asymmetric decentralization arrangements of
expenditures and revenues.
In the following discussion we review what is that we can learn from the literature for how
fiscal decentralization through different channels might impact poverty and income inequality
outcomes. We first discuss the direct effects, then the indirect effects, and finally the potential
reverse causality between poverty and income distribution vis-à-vis fiscal decentralization.
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Direct effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income distribution

The question about the potential direct effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income
inequality involves the broadly unsolved issue of what should be the role of sub-national
governments in the implementation of redistributive policies. On the one hand, the traditional
public finance literature advises against the participation of sub-national governments in
redistributive policies (Stigler 1957; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1968,1972; and Brown and Oates
1987). On the other hand, there is a growing and widely accepted recognition of the important
role of sub-national governments in facilitating, catalyzing and coordinating the implementation
of pro-poor policies. Indeed, the reduction of poverty and inequalities seems to be, in practice, an
unavoidable concern of sub-national governments; and outright redistributive policies are a rather
common practice of sub-national governments in decentralized countries.11
The reasons for the traditional theory to advice against the active participation of subnational governments in redistributive policies are built on efficiency grounds. In order to
improve the standard of living of the poor a sub-national government should, ceteris paribus,
increase the tax burden of the rich, who in the absence of greater benefits might eventually try to
migrate to other jurisdictions with lower taxes. At the same time, the poor in neighboring
jurisdictions might try to move in. As a result, the costs of redistributive programs would tend to
increase while the tax base of the jurisdiction would tend to erode, making the redistributive
policy ineffective. Clearly, the case against an active redistributive role of sub-national
governments critically depends on the inter-jurisdictional mobility of population and productive

11

Regarding the participation of sub-national governments in redistributive policies see, for instance, Bahl, MartinezVazquez and Wallace (2002).
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factors; and in actual fact fiscally induced migration is by itself considered in the traditional
literature as a source of economic distortions and inefficiencies.
When mobility is imperfect or costly, however, sub-national governments may become
efficient players in the implementation of redistributive policies. Assuming limited mobility,
Pauly (1973) shows not only that under some conditions (majority voting and utility interdependence) the size of redistributive programs increases with decentralization, but also that the
redistributive performance of sub-national governments is superior to centralized redistribution.12
In this context, and based on the observation that mobility tends to be relatively low in developing
countries, some authors have suggested that sub-national governments could be able to make a
valuable contribution to fighting poverty.13 Here of course, the concerns about the ability of subnational governments to carry out redistributive policies would move towards the effective
accountability of local government officials, the potential for local-elite capture, and their
managerial and administrative capabilities.
But the importance of inter-jurisdictional mobility is not limited to the efficiency and
effectiveness of sub-national redistributive policies. By itself, inter-jurisdictional mobility can
have important effects on poverty and income inequality. On the one hand, mobility may be seen
as a response of individuals and households who seek to increase their real income, and so by
itself the sorting processes of individuals among jurisdictions offering alternative bundles of
public services and tax burdens may alter poverty and the distribution of income. On the other

12

A similar result is suggested by Pfingsten and Wagener (1997), who show that for certain interregional transfer
mechanisms, decentralized intraregional redistribution can yield efficient outcomes.
13
Inter-jurisdictional mobility might be constrained either because of cultural, ethnic, geographical or economic
factors (e.g., people might not want to move or the costs of doing so might be too high), or because of legal
restrictions imposed on mobility. With respect to the latter, some countries (e.g., the former Soviet Union and China)
have used internal passports with the explicit purpose of restricting inter-jurisdictional mobility.
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hand, mobility certainly affects the supply of productive factors and thus also their marginal
productivity and return (Wildasin 1994).
Inter-jurisdictional mobility can also affect poverty and income distribution because it can
plausibly alter the tax and expenditures policies at the sub-national level of government. The tax
competition literature has traditionally focused on the “negative” consequences of interjurisdictional mobility.14 In a closed economy, mobile factors tend to avoid tax burdens by
migrating from higher taxed jurisdictions until the after-tax rate of return is equalized nationwide.
In an open economy, mobility of factors might be even higher and so the negative effects of
mobility are increased. Tax competition involving mobile factors can lead to a “race to the
bottom” as local governments are forced to reduce their tax rates in order to avoid further erosion
of the tax base, leading to lower revenues and to the under-provision of local public services.15
In contrast, attracting migration by efficient spending might also have some
counterbalancing effects. In his seminal work, Tiebout (1956) established that, under certain
conditions, taxpayer mobility allows for a better match of the heterogeneous preferences of
constituencies and the autonomous revenue and expenditure decisions of sub-national
governments. In this vein, based on the positive effect that migration would have on the value of
properties, Wilson and Gordon (2003) suggest that depending on the production function of
public goods and services, expenditure competition can potentially reduce tax burdens and thus
improve welfare.16 Still, migration will also be associated with an increase in labor supply which
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A different (positive) view of inter-jurisdictional competition is offered in the public choice literature as a way to
control the growth of government (Leviathan) and streamline public expenditures (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
15
Surveys of the tax competition literature are provided by Wilson (1999) and Wildasin (2005),
16
They use a principal agent framework to analyze the behavior of local government officials, who are assumed to
benefit from the “waste” of expenditures in perks, and show that differences in the quality of local public goods
(negatively related with the proportion of perks over total expenditures) across jurisdictions would induce migration
toward those areas where government officials spend less on perks and more on public goods. Population mobility
leads in this case to expenditure competition, providing a control mechanism by which local officials engage in
welfare enhancing policies.
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can plausibly reduce wages; therefore, the final effect on the income of original residents is
uncertain.
In all, inter-jurisdictional mobility appears to be a distinctive determinant of the potential
effects that fiscal decentralization might have on poverty and income inequalities. If mobility is
constrained, redistributive policies carried out at the local level might be effective and inflict no
efficiency costs. In addition, potentially large gains could be obtained by decentralizing some
redistributive decisions and bringing them closer to the poor.
Fiscal decentralization can also alter poverty and income inequality through its effects on
the composition of public expenditures. Public resources can be transferred to the poor as part of
redistributive programs, and thus directly increase their disposable income. In general, however,
there are many public expenditure programs that might have a pro-poor nature and thus help to
alleviate poverty even without direct income transfers. Important examples are primary health and
basic education, which might explicitly be targeted to the poor or to regions with low per capita
levels of income or production, and which per se can also contribute to improve the distribution
of income in the short and longer term. Arze, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2005) find that the
share of education and health in total government expenditures increases with fiscal
decentralization. Generally, these services have a positive impact on human capital development
and, through this venue, fiscal decentralization might be expected to have a positive effect on the
welfare of the poor.17
In the revenue side, fiscal decentralization can also affect the progressiveness of the tax
system and therefore alter the distribution of disposable income. For example, sub-national
17

See, for instance, Martinez-Vazquez (2001). The measurement of these effects is complicated because education
and health expenditures do not have a direct impact on personal income. While the effect of transfers in cash on
income distribution can be measured via Gini coefficients computed on a disposable income basis, in the case of
public expenditures the pro-poor effect must be measured through benefit incidence analysis and these effects should
only show up in future measurements of the Gini measures.
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governments might be financed mainly by indirect taxation, which tends to be more regressive, or
by property taxes, which generally are less progressive than the tax mix used by central
governments.18 In this context, a greater reliance on sub-national tax collection might reduce the
progressivity of the tax system at the national level.
Naturally, the net incidence effect of tax and expenditure policies will also depend on the
criteria by which public funds are distributed across jurisdictions. In practice, the decentralization
of expenditure responsibilities is associated with expenditure needs whose costs significantly
exceed the fiscal capacity gained with the devolution of tax revenue autonomy.19 The asymmetric
decentralization of expenditures and revenues creates vertical imbalances and, consequently,
requires transfers from the center to the sub-national governments in order to balance the public
budget of each level of government. Intergovernmental transfers are a distinctive element of all
fiscally decentralized systems of government, and the type of transfers, their magnitude and
economic justification can significantly differ from country to country. In a general sense,
transfers can be considered as redistributive programs, but even though they can plausibly be used
to address poverty and income inequalities among individuals, they are not necessarily meant to
have this objective. In particular, equalization transfers, used to compensate those sub-national
governments that are less able to provide public services, might have from a benefit incidence
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The conventional wisdom about the incidence of local taxes is that revenue decentralization usually has regressive
effects on income distribution. See Boex et al. (2006). However, some studies, for example Sennoga, Sjoquist and
Wallace (2008), suggest that the property tax can be progressive in developing countries.
19
There are several reasons for this to happen. Tax administration requires technical capabilities that the sub-national
governments might lack, and even if they have those capabilities, the tax collection process might still be subject to
economies of scale that give the central government a comparative efficiency advantage in collecting taxes.
Alternatively, the central government might simply prefer to keep for itself the most buoyant tax bases. This is
arguably a good strategy for the central government to retain the ability of implementing stabilization policies, but in
some cases a tight decentralization of tax revenue sources is an attempt to limit the political power of sub-national
authorities.
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point of view a positive redistributive effect. 20 Since poverty is usually related with lower fiscal
capacity and greater expenditure needs, then we may expect larger equalization transfers to be
given to those jurisdictions with poorer populations. 21
There might be other ways by which fiscal decentralization could directly affect poverty
and income inequalities, and that ultimately depend on the specific characteristics of each fiscal
decentralization process.22 One example is given by public employment. Alesina, Danninger and
Rostagno (2001) show how public employment has been used as a redistributive device in Italy;
the central government finances more jobs at higher real salaries in the south, where the average
income of the population is comparatively lower than in the north.23
All in all, there are too many direct channels by which fiscal decentralization may improve
or worsen poverty and the distribution of income; and it seems extremely difficult to anticipate
the net direct effects of fiscal decentralization on these variables.

Indirect effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income distribution

As indicated above, by indirect effects of fiscal decentralization we refer to its effects on the
determinants of poverty and distribution of income, which might be found in the socio-economic
framework where the fiscal decentralization process takes place. In particular, we focus here on
20

Intergovernmental equalization transfers can also be justified on efficiency grounds, as a way to reduce spillovers
created by autonomous decisions at the local level.
21
An alternative equalization approach is suggested by Buchanan (1950). Based on the principle of “equal treatment
of equals,” he proposes to equalize the “fiscal residuum” (defined as the difference between the contributions made
by an individual and the value of public services received) across individuals with equal income. Under this scheme,
equalization transfers would have, by definition, a null effect on income distribution cum public service benefits.
22
Sub-national borrowing might have an impact on poverty income distribution by affecting, for instance, the
affordability of pro-poor expenditure programs and the intergenerational distribution of tax burdens and benefits from
public services. There are, however, few (mainly developed) countries where sub-national governments have general
access to credit markets.
23
See also related studies for the United States (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 2000), for Spain (Marqués and Rosselló
2004), and for a cross-country analysis (Martinez-Vazquez and Yao 2009).
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certain macroeconomic outcomes that can be affected by fiscal decentralization, and that have
been identified in the literature as potential determinants of poverty and the distribution of
income. Some examples of these outcomes are economic growth, macroeconomic stability,
regional convergence, the size of government, and the degree of institutional development. To the
extent that fiscal decentralization has measurable effects on these outcomes, then indirectly, it
would be expected to have measurable effects on poverty and the distribution of income.
According to Oates (1993, 240), the argument by which local decision making can lead to
(static) social benefits due to a better tailoring of public services and preferences (Oates 1972),
“should also have some validity in a dynamic setting of economic growth.” If policies regarding
infrastructure and human capital are formulated with consideration of regional or local conditions,
he argues, then they “are likely to be more effective in encouraging economic development than
centrally determined policies that ignore these geographical differences.” In line with this
hypothesis, several empirical studies have analyzed the impact of fiscal decentralization on
growth,24 but the results are rather mixed and seem to depend on the stage of development of the
countries.25 Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) suggest that the causal relationship between
fiscal decentralization and growth might not be linear, and there could plausibly be an optimal
level of decentralization after which more devolution of fiscal authority has a negative impact on
economic development. Overall, the existence of a causal relationship between decentralization
and economic growth, and therefore the indirect impact of fiscal decentralization on poverty and
inequalities through this macroeconomic outcome, has not yet been clearly established.
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Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) and Breuss and Eller (2004) provide more detailed surveys about the
literature on fiscal decentralization and growth.
25
For example, Davoodi and Zou (1998) find a negative relationship in developing countries, while Akai and Sakata
(2002) find a significant positive relationship across states in the US. More recently, Baskaran and Feld (2009)
analyze the case of OECD countries and conclude that fiscal decentralization has no effect on economic growth.
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The empirical evidence about the effects of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic
stability is even more limited. The classical approach to the problem is that macroeconomic
policy should be an exclusive responsibility of the central government (Musgrave 1959). In line
with this normative prescription, some authors argue that fiscal decentralization aggravates
macroeconomic instability (Rodden 2002; Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack 2003). However, others
authors argue that devolving some macroeconomic policy attributions to subnational governments
can promote, not hinder, macroeconomic stability (Gramlich 1993; Shah 1999; Rodden and
Wibbels 2002). These results are relevant because the poor are presumably more vulnerable to
macroeconomic shocks reducing the economic activity and the demand for unskilled workers. In
addition, the poor are less able to protect themselves against the loss of purchasing power due to
high rates inflation. In a recent paper, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006), using a panel data
set that include both developed and developing countries find that fiscal decentralization does not
present a threat to price stability. On the other hand, however, Treisman (2000) and Rodden and
Wibbels (2002) find no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation.
Overall, the question about whether fiscal decentralization affects macroeconomic and price
stability remains an open question, but the potential indirect effects on poverty and inequalities
might plausibly be significant if fiscal decentralization does indeed promote macroeconomic
stability.
Regional inequalities in per capita income can also be important in determining poverty
and the distribution of income. Unfortunately, we know very little about the effects of
decentralization on regional economic disparities. One possible presumption is that the state of
regional development within the country might be less homogeneous under decentralized
systems; however, we have no evidence to support this claim. On the other hand, there has been
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considerable research on the issue of regional convergence. The relevance of this literature for
this paper is that poverty and the distribution of personal income might be expected to improve at
the national level if regions tend to converge in terms of per capita GRP. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1991) have found strong statistical evidence of regional convergence in both the US and in a
group of seven European countries, but also that the rate of convergence is very low, around 2%
per year. Further, they found that migration explains only a marginal fraction of the rate of
convergence.26 Their results are fairly typical of the empirical literature on regional convergence;
empirical studies commonly find that some sort of convergence tends to take place but the rate of
convergence is very slow. The theoretical work in this area identifies several sources of
convergence (de la Fuente, 2002). First, a necessary condition for convergence is the presence of
diminishing returns to scale in the different forms of capital. Second, the rates of technological
progress and the reallocation of factors from sectors with low productivity to others with higher
productivity determine the existence of convergence and its velocity. In a recent study,
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2009) find that the relation between fiscal (and political)
decentralization varies significantly with the level of development. They conclude that fiscal
decentralization may contribute to reduce regional disparities in developed countries, but that the
opposite happens in their sample of seven low income countries.
The size of the government is another macroeconomic outcome that can potentially affect
poverty and income distribution. If the public sector is relatively big then it would have more
capacity to implement sizable welfare programs with greater impacts on poverty and inequalities.
The traditional public finance theory suggests that even though inter-jurisdictional tax
competition tends to reduce the size of sub-national governments, the resulting amount of public

The results are referred to as β-convergence, which accounts for the tendency of poor regions to grow faster (or
slower if they diverge) than rich regions.
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expenditures can be either over or under the optimal level. On the one hand, the Leviathan
hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan 1980), assumes that government officials are self-interested
and seek to maximize their own power, represented by the size of the budget under their control.
While their actions would therefore pursue a non-optimal increase of expenditures, interjurisdictional tax competition arising in the context of fiscal federalism would provide a binding
constraint to the inefficient increase in government size. On the other hand, even when policy
makers are assumed to be benevolent and maximize collective welfare, tax competition might
impose downward pressure over revenue collections and the size of government, leading to
under-provision of public services. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) provide a complete
review of the empirical literature examining the impact of decentralization on the size of
government and conclude that the evidence does not provide a definite answer to the problem.27
Finally, fiscal decentralization can also have an indirect effect on poverty and inequalities
through its effects on institutional development. In reality, the presumption that fiscal
decentralization would affect the institutions in a country is rather tautological, because by itself
fiscal decentralization represents an institutional reform. However, the final effects on poverty
and inequalities are unclear, and depend on the quality of the reforms as well as on the value
assigned to poverty and inequalities as policy targets in the new fiscally decentralized scenario.
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In a recent paper, Fiva (2006), using new OECD data based on Stegarescu (2005) which allow distinguishing subnational taxes according to their degree of local autonomy, finds that revenue decentralization reduces the size of the
public sector. In addition, he also finds that the traditional measures of expenditure decentralization are positive
related to government size.

28
Reverse causality: The potential effects of poverty and income distribution
on fiscal decentralization

A review of the decentralization literature can identify some channels by which income
distribution has been thought capable of shaping the process of fiscal decentralization. For
example, the literature on secessions attempts to identify the sources of net benefits (and ensuing
redistribution) that can be obtained from complete separation from the central authorities.28 In
fact, some theories of secession and the optimal size of countries rest on the simplifying
assumption that the public sector has mainly (sometimes exclusively) a redistributive purpose.29
Demands for decentralization may also be driven by some regions’ higher preferences for
redistributive policies vis-a-vis the national level.30 On the other hand, fiscal decentralization may
also be used by higher income groups and regions to protect themselves against unwanted
redistribution policies. For example, in a Tiebout world with uniform communities in preferences
and income, there is little room for net fiscal redistribution in taxes and services;31 and highly
decentralized systems will find it more difficult to reach regional consensus to implement
significant equalization policies.
Even though the main economic argument in favor of fiscal decentralization stresses the
efficiency gains associated with a better match of heterogeneous preferences across jurisdictions,
the movement towards greater fiscal decentralization around the world appears to be often
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Secession can be considered an extreme case of devolution. Secession may be inefficient because of the possible
reduction of inter-regional trade and the loss of economies of scale in public goods’ provision (Bolton and Roland
1997). However, these costs may be acceptable to some groups, especially those that stand to benefit directly from
the redistribution of power. Secessions have become rather common in recent years; the URSS, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia are examples. In some other countries, like Italy, Spain, Canada or Belgium, secession is an ongoing
debate.
29
See, for example, the work by Meltzer and Richard (1981).
30
See Bolton and Roland (1997) and Beramendi (2003).
31
See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez (1982).
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dominated by political considerations.32 The reorganization of the government through fiscal
decentralization can be seen as an answer to central government failures or as a way of addressing
different national problems, like ethnic conflicts, separatism, and development objectives. Fiscal
decentralization can also be a way of strengthening democratic political institutions and basic
civil rights (Shah 2004); and as a strategy to reduce corruption through improved governance.33
Regardless of the merits of these arguments, the decentralization literature has for long accepted
that fiscal decentralization can consist of very different processes in developed and developing
countries, especially in regards to “quality” of government (La Porta et al. 1998). In this context,
discontent regarding government’s goals and performance in reducing poverty and inequalities, as
well as the expectation that a fiscally decentralized system would better serve for these purposes,
might plausibly ignite additional pressures for a fiscal decentralization reform.
The available decentralization literature has not identified poverty and income inequalities
as relevant determinants of the fiscal decentralization reform.34 Notable exceptions are found in
Beramendi (2003, 2007), who argues that the political process might make decentralization
endogenous to (the territorial structure of) income inequality. In the end, however, whether or not
fiscal decentralization is endogenously determined by poverty level and the degree of inequalities
will depend on the specific characteristics of each country. In this sense, the endogenous
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty and income inequalities remains a
hypothesis to be tested.
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See Rondinelli and Nellis (1986) for an early presentation of this argument.
The impact of decentralization on corruption (positive or negative) is an on-going debate. See Martinez-Vazquez,
Arze and Boex (2007) for a review of the arguments and empirical findings.
34
The main factors identified in the literature as determinants the observed degree of fiscal decentralization are per
capita income, economic growth, population, land area, ethnic fragmentation, democratization, urbanization,
intergovernmental grants and globalization are among the most common. Letelier (2005) and Arzaghi and Henderson
(2005) survey the theoretical and empirical literature devoted to identifying these factors.
33

30
The Determinants of Poverty and Income Inequalities:
A Review of the Empirical Literature

In order to analyze the potential role that fiscal decentralization might play in explaining poverty
and income inequalities, it is important to account for other relevant determinants of these two
variables already identified in the empirical literature.
The conventional theory identifies the demand for unskilled workers as one of the most
important determinants of poverty and income inequalities (Atkinson 2000). In addition, in recent
years several authors have highlighted the importance of institutional and social factors, formerly
ignored in empirical studies. For example, Atkinson (1997) emphasizes the role of institutional
determinants of wages and employment and some macroeconomic variables like the interest rate
and the income share of the factors of production to explain recent trends in income inequalities
in a sample of developed countries.35 Similarly, Tanzi (2000) argues that human capital, which
usually stands for a high share of total income, tends to be much less concentrated in developed
economies, which helps to explain their lower levels of income inequality; he also stresses the
role of social norms and institutions in determining the endurance of poverty and income
inequalities, including labor contract legislation, traditional rental contracts, norms about
marriages, rules about inheritance, and the existence of positional rents or “social capital.” These
new perspectives advocate for policies focused on generating and redistributing human capital,
which are said to have a very significant impact on poverty and income distribution. Some studies
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These determinants are presented as alternative explanations for the observed increase of income inequality in G7
countries between the late 70s and the early 90s. The fact that the real rate of return has increased explains in part
why the share of capital income has also gone up during the period, and thus how the owners of capital, the non-poor,
have benefited in relative terms.
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support this hypothesis by showing a negative and significant relationship between education
(measured as enrolment rates or years of schooling) and income inequalities. 36
Some research has also focused on the structure and characteristics of the political system
in order to explain poverty and income inequalities. For instance, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990)
explore the possible effects of democracy on income distribution. More democracy with stronger
political representation or a better organization of the poor (e.g. through unions) could allow for
more active and systematic redistributive policies. A more democratic society, however, does not
necessarily represent the interests of all constituencies equally, thus it might plausibly be less able
to address poverty and income inequalities than an authoritative system.37 In particular, the
studies by Durham (1999) and Beramendi (2003, 2007) are some of the few examples that include
decentralization as a determinant of income inequality. They also include other political variables
such as regime-type (dictatorship versus democracy) or left government partisanship, and the
unionization of labor markets. Finally, Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (1998) find that a
poorly functioning political system represented by high levels of corruption leads, in average, to
higher income inequalities.
The empirical literature has given special attention to the interdependence of economic
growth and income distribution. The most important proposition regarding this subject is
described by the Kuznets’ hypothesis. Kuznets (1955) suggests that economic growth initially
leads to greater income inequality because the benefits of development are first collected by the
high income segment of society. After the level of development reaches certain point, then the
36

For example, Barro (2000) finds that primary schooling significantly reduces inequalities, secondary schooling is
not significant and higher education significantly increases inequalities. Chu, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) find
negative effects of secondary enrollment rates on income inequality but with varying degrees of significance.
37
Reuveni and Li (2003) find a negative and significant effect of democracy on income inequality. Other authors
point out that given the clear correlation between development and democracy it is difficult, if not impossible, to
separate the effects of both variables on income inequality (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Perotti 1996; and Durham
1999).
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benefits become available for the poor and inequalities (and poverty) tend to diminish.38 The
available evidence provides some support for this hypothesis and the Kuznets’ curve has even
been referred to as an empirical regularity (Barro 2000), but still there is no general consensus
about its validity.39
Besides economic growth or the level of development, other macroeconomic variables
that have been given attention are openness to trade and inflation. One view on the effects of trade
openness on income distribution is based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, according to which
the abundant factor in the economy, or the one defining the comparative advantages of a country,
is the main beneficiary of trade liberalization. Since unskilled labor is relatively abundant in
developing countries, income inequalities would be expected to decrease when developing
countries are more open to trade. An alternative view is that trade liberalization will benefit more
those better able to take advantage of the new opportunities offered by globalization. Both
conjectures have received empirical support in recent studies.40
Inflation typically leads to a transfer from those with higher propensity to consume to
those who are able and willing to substitute future for present consumption. In such a context,
devaluations of the exchange rate as well as high market premiums that are reflected in higher
price levels would be associated with increasing income inequalities (Bahmani-Oskooee,
Goswami and Mebratu 2006).
The demographic configuration of a country has also been shown to be an important
determinant of both poverty and income inequalities. Three important variables considered in the
38

Kuznets explains this trend by describing the shift from the agricultural sector to the nonagricultural sector, and
stresses the importance of industrialization and urbanization in economic development.
39
For example, among others, Barro (2000), Vanhoudt (2000) and Thornton (2001) find support for the hypothesis
and Deininger and Squire (1998) do not. See Moran (2005) for a review of the historical importance of the Kuznets’
hypothesis.
40
Barro (2000) finds a positive and significant effect of trade openness on income inequality, with the effect being
more pronounced in poor countries. However, Reuveni and Li (2003) find a negative effect.
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empirical literature are population growth, the age dependency ratio and urban population.
Population growth reduces the relative average income of those demographic groups growing
faster, usually the poor, which in turn worsens the distribution of income.41 Furthermore, if
population growth is concentrated in low-income groups, then a higher age dependency ratio can
be associated with increased inequalities (Firebaugh 1999). High rates of population growth might
be negatively related to the proportion of population over 65 years old, which have on average
lower but less unequal income than the working population. Finally, the urban population
generally enjoys a greater average income than the rural population, but at the same time income
is usually more unequal in urban areas.42 Martinez-Vazquez, Panudulkitti and Timofeev (2009)
find a U-shaped relationship between the level of urbanization and poverty using a large panel
data set; while poverty tends to decrease with the level of urbanization in the country, after
urbanization reaches a threshold the poverty level tends to increase again.

Empirical analyses: The Effects of Fiscal Decentralization
on Poverty and Income Inequality

In this section we analyze the effects fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequality
using a panel dataset for a large number of developed and developing countries. As we have seen,
there are several channels through which fiscal decentralization can influence poverty and the
distribution of income and, in the absence of an all-encompassing model, it is not possible to

41

Perotti (1996) explains the link between these two variables in the context of income distribution.
In reality, urban inequalities could plausibly be either lower or higher than the urban-rural inequality in income,
and therefore the sign of the effect of urbanization on income distribution is uncertain. According to Kuznets (1955),
economic development is associated with higher urbanization, and so inequalities would likely increase when rates of
urbanization (and development) are low and rising, and they would be reduced in more advanced stages of
urbanization due to the overall rise in average income. See also Perotti (1996).

42
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predict the direction of these influences. Moreover, the final effect of fiscal decentralization on
poverty and income inequalities depends on an array of socio-economic factors that can further
condition the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequalities. In this context,
our empirical strategy consists, first, of controlling for other variables identified in the empirical
literature as significant determinants of poverty and income inequalities; and second, of
accounting for the potential endogeneity or reverse causation between fiscal decentralization and
poverty and income inequality. Our aim is to capture in the estimated coefficients the overall
(direct and indirect) effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty and income inequalities.
The data come from a variety of sources as described in Appendix I; the specific countries
and periods considered vary due to data availability. In order to neutralize the effect of business
cycles, we average most variables over five-year periods. The period averages should allow us to
also improve the quality of two of the main variables of interest, the expenditure decentralization
measure and the Gini coefficient, which are potentially subject to measurement error due to
inconsistent definitions and measurement procedures.
We begin by analyzing the effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty and then,
separately, we turn to analyze the effect of fiscal decentralization on inequalities in the
distribution of income.

The effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty

The dependent variable, poverty, is measured by the headcount ratio and the poverty gap defined
for a poverty line of US$1.25 (in purchasing power parity), and alternatively, by the Human
Development Index (HDI). We use the three measures of poverty in order to find consistent
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evidence about the effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty. However, as it turns out, only the
HDI provides a data sample that is large enough to extract meaningful conclusions from the
econometric analysis.
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 65 countries, 41 developing and 24
developed, and it comprises five (five-year) periods between 1976 and 2000. A list of the
countries included in the sample and the summary statistics for the variables used in the
estimation are presented in Tables II.1 and II.2, respectively in Appendix II.
We allow for the independent variable of interest, fiscal decentralization to have a nonlinear effect on poverty. Our objective is to contrast the traditional view about the redistributive
role of sub-national governments, according to which their intervention in redistributive policies
is ineffective and should be avoided, with the role that in practice sub-national governments are
playing in reducing poverty. As we have explained, there are several direct and indirect channels
by which sub-national governments can influence poverty, and their involvement in redistributive
policies seems to be, in practice, a widespread reality.
The econometric specification for the estimation including the non-linear effect of fiscal
decentralization on poverty is:
Poverty it = a1 FD it + a2 FD it2 + B [Controls it] + e it
A quadratic effect of fiscal decentralization on poverty might allow to distinguish two
possible scenarios; one in which sub-national governments are effectively helping in reducing
poverty, from another scenario in which their involvement in redistributive policies is
counterproductive. For instance, if the coefficients of fiscal decentralization (FD) and FD squared
are both statistically insignificant (or, if significant, close to zero or negative) then a greater share
of sub-national government expenditures over the general public budget would be associated with
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no better poverty outcomes. In contrast, the participation of sub-national governments in
redistributive policies would be considered as effective if at least a1 is statistically significant, and
the combined effect of a1 and a2 leads to greater human development.
Based on the available empirical literature, which is summarized in Section 4, we also
include a number of control variables to account for the effects that other socioeconomic factors
might have on poverty. The first control is government size, which represents the dimension of
the public budget and therefore the ability or potential to carry out significant poverty alleviation
policies.43 In theory, we expect fiscal decentralization to have an indirect effect on poverty by
altering the size of the government sector as well as through changing the composition of
government expenditures; however, we include the size of the government as an independent
variable in order to explicitly account for other possible effects that are not indirectly explained
by fiscal decentralization. 44
The demographic configuration is represented by population growth, the age dependency
ratio, and the share of population living in urban areas. These are all variables that have been
found in the previous literature to have significant effects on poverty. Both population growth and
the age dependency ratio are related with a reduction of average per capita income and thus can
be expected to increase poverty, and therefore to display a negative sign. In contrast, urban
population usually enjoys higher income per capita and should be associated with a reduction of
poverty, displaying a positive sign.

43

Government size is computed as the general government share in real GDP, and consists of the final goods and
services purchased by the government. Note that the funds allocated to social security and welfare programs are
excluded from this measure; since social spending is likely influenced by poverty levels, the inclusion of those
spending programs would have required treating the size of government as an endogenous variable.
44
This means, of course, that the estimated coefficients for fiscal decentralization will be short of capturing the net
total (direct and indirect) effects on poverty.
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An index of democracy is used to represent structural characteristics of the political
system and the responsiveness of government towards preferences related to poverty reduction
and the universal satisfaction of basic needs in the country. In general, we expect the coefficient
for this control variable to take a positive sign, although this is not consistently supported by the
previous literature.
Finally, we also include openness to international trade as an additional control variable;
this is a commonly used control variable in the empirical literatures on poverty and income
inequalities; but there is neither theoretical nor empirical consensus about the sign of its influence.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 1. Because we use an international
panel data set, it is unlikely that any regression specification will be able to control for all the
individual country effects that may affect poverty. For example, countries may differ in the
distribution of general political ideology or for historical or other reasons in their acceptance of a
significant level of poverty. For these reasons, we begin by allowing for unobserved specific
country (and time) effects and use fixed effects estimation.
The first two regressions use the headcount ratio and the poverty gap as the dependent
variables, and control for the log of per capita GDP (at purchasing power parity) in order to
account for different levels of development. As expected, per capita GDP is associated with a
reduction of the two poverty measures and is statistically significant. In addition, only urban
population and openness to trade appear as having a significant effect in both regressions. Urban
location is known to lead generally to higher income levels than rural living, which may explain
the negative sign and statiscally significant coefficient for this variable. In contrast, the coefficient
of openness to trade is positive and significant, suggesting that the gains from international trade
do not reach the poor in our sample of countries.
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Table 1. The determinants of poverty
Dependent variable:

Headcount

Poverty Gap

Model:

Fixed Effects
regression

Fixed Effects
regression

(1)
Fiscal Decentralization (%)
Fiscal Decentralization (%) squared
Government size (% GDP)
Log of per capita GDP
Population growth (%)
Age dependency (%)
Urban population (%)
Index of democracy

-0.464
(0.543)
0.012
(0.012)
0.161
(0.305)
-17.920 ***
(4.154)
-3.112
(2.308)
-0.220
(0.207)
-0.724 **
(0.359)
-0.010
(0.036)

(2)
-0.255
(0.301)
0.007
(0.006)
0.151
(0.181)
-7.552 ***
(2.739)
-1.483
(1.322)
-0.226 *
(0.123)
-0.466 **
(0.194)
0.005
(0.020)

Average schooling years total population
Openness to international trade

0.093 *
(0.049)

0.056 **
(0.028)

HDI

HDI

HDI

Fixed Effects
regression

Random Effects
GLS regression

Random Effects
GLS regression

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.224 **
(0.098)
-0.003 **
(0.002)
-0.060 *
(0.035)

0.184 **
(0.091)
-0.003 **
(0.002)
-0.052
(0.037)

0.146 *
(0.084)
-0.003 **
(0.001)
-0.052
(0.038)

0.362
(0.420)
-0.026
(0.036)
0.261 ***
(0.054)
-0.004
(0.008)
0.311
(0.310)
-0.023 *
(0.012)

0.244
(0.393)
-0.099 **
(0.039)
0.328 ***
(0.038)
0.004
(0.008)
1.440 ***
(0.270)
-0.011
(0.010)

0.210
(0.385)
-0.087
(0.037)
0.228
(0.035)
0.003
(0.008)
1.048
(0.256)
-0.006
(0.010)
-4.190
(3.770)
3.978
(2.229)
-12.781
(1.938)

dummy Sub-Saharan Africa
dummy Latin America & Caribbean
dummy Developing Country
Constant
Observations
Number of countries
R-square within
R-square between
R-square overall

219.121 ***
(51.020)

105.185 ***
(32.309)

63.209 ***
(4.294)

132
47

132
47

297
65

297
65

297
65

0.4122
0.5549
0.5730

0.3618
0.3141
0.3401

0.8286
0.6738
0.6470

0.7934
0.8272
0.8131

0.8107
0.8546
0.8559

989.17
0.0000

1513.34
0.0000

144.636
0.0000

111.976
0.0000

26.6

24.7

Wald test
p-value
Test of overidentifying restrictions
p-value
Turning point of the FD effect

32.4

54.231 ***
(4.234)

**
***

***

*
***

69.827 ***
(3.985)

Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include year’s dummies (not shown)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

The variables of interest, fiscal decentralization and fiscal decentralization squared display
no significant relationship with the headcount ratio and the poverty gap. However, their sign is the
same in both regressions and suggest that fiscal decentralization might initially help to reduce
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poverty (according to the negative sign of fiscal decentralization) and that this influence is
reverted with the extent of fiscal decentralization (as implied by the positive sign of fiscal
decentralization squared).
The first two regressions are run over a relatively small sample of 132 observations. In
addition, the use of the fixed effects model notably reduces the degrees of freedom available for
the estimations. In this context, there might not be sufficient information in the sample to find a
significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and the poverty measures. One possible
strategy is to use random effect estimators, but the test of overidentifying restrictions (Schaffer
and Stillman 2006) suggests that the independent variables are correlated with the countryspecific error and thus the random effects model is not adequate.45 Alternatively, we use the
Human Development Index (HDI) as a proxy for poverty, and take advantage of the fact that the
measures of the HDI are more readily available. Although the HDI is a broader measure of
welfare than the headcount ratio and the poverty gap, it is not a surprise that these variables are
highly correlated.46
The HDI combines normalized measures of population health and longevity, knowledge
and education, and standard of living; and varies in the same direction than the level of human
development. As a consequence, an increase of the HDI should represent a reduction of poverty
and vice versa. The HDI does not suffer from the same inconsistencies that affect the measures of
fiscal decentralization and the Gini coefficient. Indeed, the HDI is based on well defined measures
of per capita GDP and health and education outcomes widely available for most countries. 47 For
45

The Sargan-Hansen statistics are 24.92 and 26.00 for the first and second regressions, respectively, while the
associated p-values are 0.024 and 0.017, which are low enough to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between
the independent variables and the country-specific error implicit in the random effects model.
46
The correlation between the HDI and the two previous measures of poverty, the headcount index and the poverty
gap is, respectively, -0.85 and -0.79 in our data sample.
47
Note that since the log of per capita GDP is used to construct the HDI we exclude this variable from the set of
regressors.
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estimation purposes we use the single year measures of the HDI at the end of each five-year
period. This might allow us to capture some of the effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty
that may not be observed within the same period that the fiscal decentralization reform is
implemented. The HDI measures come from the most recently data set released by the United
Nations Development Programme, which include measures for the HDI since 1980.
In column (3) we present the first regression for the HDI as the dependent variable using a
fixed effects estimation model; note also that this regression incorporates a control variable for
education, usually considered as an important determinant of poverty.48 Since our dependent
variable is partially defined in terms of education factors (specifically, using the adult literacy rate
and an average of primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratios) our education
explanatory variable is defined as the average years of schooling for the total population; this
variable is meant to capture the effect that accumulated education, or human capital, might have
on the measure of poverty.
The quadratic effect of fiscal decentralization on the HDI (Table 1, column 3) is
significant at the 5% level and displays an “inverted U” shape.49 Starting from a hypothetical
point where there is no fiscal decentralization (FD = 0), a movement towards fiscal
decentralization increases the HDI (or decreases poverty), up to a point where more fiscal
decentralization appears to have a negative effects on poverty. The turning point of the fiscal
decentralization effects is shown at the bottom of Table 1, and for the fixed effects regression
(column 1) it corresponds to 32.4%. This implies that, on average, when sub-national
expenditures represent about one-third of total expenditures, sub-national budgets reach a
48

The variable education was not included in the first and second regressions because of data availability. Given the
limited number of education measures, the already small sample used in these two regressions is reduced up to the
point where there are no enough degrees of freedom to obtain the fixed effects estimators.
49
In general, we expect the signs of the coefficients of the regressions on the HDI to change with respect to those of
the first and second regressions.
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maximum level of efficacy in poverty reduction as measured by HDI; deepening fiscal
decentralization beyond that point ends up in increased poverty levels. These effects are
illustrated in Figure 2.
The control variables do not appear, in general, to have considerable predictive power.
Population growth, age dependency, democracy and education are not statistically significant.
The size of government and trade openness, both with negative sign, are significant at the 10%
level, but their coefficient is relatively small. Only the percentage of urban population appears as
a relevant predictor of poverty.

Figure 2. The effect of fiscal decentralization (FD) on poverty
Net effect of
FD on HDI

32.4%

FD

In column (4) we present the random effects generalized least squares (GLS) estimation
using the same set of variables. Fiscal decentralization maintains the same pattern of influence,
although the turning point of its peak influence on poverty is reduced to 26.6%. Regarding the
other controls, the main changes with respect to the fixed effects regression are observed in the
coefficients of age dependency and education, which become statistically significant at the 5%
and 1%, respectively, and are relevant in magnitude. Consistent with the previous literature, both
variables show the expected sign. Age dependency has a negative coefficient, implying that it is
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positively associated with poverty; while average schooling years of the total population works to
reduce poverty.
The random effect GLS estimators are obtained by assuming that the independent
variables are uncorrelated with the country-specific error. To verify the validity of this
assumption we use a test of overidentifying restrictions (Schaffer and Stillman 2006).50 In this
case, the test of overidentifying restrictions produces a Sargan-Hansen statistic (shown in the
Table) that soundly rejects the null hypothesis that independent variables are uncorrelated with
the country-specific error. Therefore, we conclude that the fixed effects model is preferred to the
random effects model.
A relevant econometric issue is whether fiscal decentralization is endogenously
determined with our measure of poverty. Under the fixed effects model we require proper timevariant instruments in order to test and correct for this problem. Unfortunately, given the
complexity of the relations between fiscal decentralization and poverty and their common
dependency in certain socio-economic factors, it is difficult to find well defined instruments.51
One alternative strategy is to attempt to partially control for the country-specific effects in
the context of the random effects GLS regression, and test if in the new specification the
independent variables are indeed uncorrelated with the country-specific error. Column (5)
presents an additional random effects GLS regression including control dummies for two regions,
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America & Caribbean, which have been found to be relevant
determinants of income inequalities. In addition, we add a third dummy that takes the value of 1
for developing countries and 0 for developed countries. In general, the results remain similar to

50

In general, the Hausman’s specification test fails to provide useful results due to the unbalanced nature of our data
samples.
51
The instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated with the error term. Using weak
instruments may actually aggravate the asymptotic bias instead of correcting it (Staiger and Stock 1997).
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those found in the second regression. However, the test of overidentifying restrictions again
rejects the null hypothesis that the regressors are uncorrelated with the country-specific error,
indicating that the fixed effect model of column (3) is still preferable.
Although the inability to control for possible endogeneity casts doubts about the validity
of the results, the consistent pattern of influence found in the regressions suggests that the nonlinear (inverted-U shaped) function might be a good approximation to the true causal relationship
between fiscal decentralization and poverty. This result is particularly important because it
implies that sub-national governments can positively contribute to poverty reduction under fairly
common conditions. Indeed, the average fiscal decentralization measure in our sample of
countries is 19.6% (see Table II.2 in Appendix II). The result indicates that the net effect of fiscal
decentralization is to work to lower the poverty level. This may be because sub-national
governments do get more directly involved in the provision of services that most immediately
help the poor but that at higher levels of decentralization the fiscal resources left at the central
level may be too scarce for implementing effective national anti-poverty programs.

The effect of fiscal decentralization on income inequality

We have seen that the channels through which fiscal decentralization may affect the distribution
of income are, for the most part, the same as those through which fiscal decentralization may
affect the poverty level. However, differences in the definition of the dependent variables and the
computational problems and availability of the Gini coefficient (our selected measure of
inequality) justify several changes in the econometric specification.
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Data on the Gini coefficient are obtained from the World Income Inequality Database
(WIID). 52 The measures available in the original dataset are computed from several definitions of
gross or disposable income and consumption, and are based on individual or household surveys
applied in rural or urban areas and nationwide. For our estimation we use only data classified as
reliable in the original database, and for consistency we choose to work with income Gini
measures based on nationwide surveys of households.53 In particular, we prefer Gini measures
based on disposable income, as opposed to gross income, because they better capture the results
of government interventions in the form of tax and expenditure policies.54 We use gross income
measures of the Gini coefficient only in those cases where a disposable income measure is not
available, and we control for the change of income base incorporating a dummy variable, equal to
1 if the Gini coefficient is based on gross income, and equal to 0 if it is based on disposable
income. 55
The resulting unbalanced data panel consists of 56 countries, from which 34 are
developing countries and 22 are developed countries. Tables III.1 and III.2 in Appendix III,

52

This data base builds on the work of Deininger and Squire (1996), who assembled a large number of Gini
coefficients available in the literature. In order to ensure the quality of the sample, they imposed several requirements
or selection criteria. The resultant data set included 682 observations for 108 countries and a varied number of years
for each country. The data set was further corrected and upgraded by UNU/WIDER, and the most recent version of
the World Income Inequality Database (WIID 2.0c), published in May 2008, includes 5,313 observations for 159
countries.
53
Gini coefficients based on expenditures are more common among developing countries and expected to be lower
than those based on income (Deininger and Squire 1996). Since the final data set includes few expenditure-based
observations, we prefer to avoid any possible noise by simply eliminating them. A similar criterion is applied to Gini
measures based on individuals, which are eliminated in order to ensure the consistency of the sample. According to
Deininger and Squire (1996), there is no reason to expect that the individual and household-based Gini measurements
would present systematic differences; however, here we follow a conservative approach in order to avoid undesirable
bias in the coefficients.
54
For further discussion see, for example, Chu, Davoodi and Gupta (2000) and Deininger and Squire (1996).
UNU/WIDER (2005) defines disposable income in accordance with the concept recommended by the Camberra
Group, as total income minus employees’ social contributions and taxes on income. Note that cash benefits from the
government including social insurance benefits, universal social assistance and mean-tested social assistance are
included as a part of total income.
55
Here we follow, among others, Durham (1999) and Barro (2000), who also use dummy variables in order to control
for differences in the measurement of the Gini coefficient.
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provide the list of countries and a summary statistic of the variables. The observations are
available from 1971 to 2000, and all variables are expressed in five-year averages.
Conceptual differences between poverty and inequality in the distribution of income call
for a differentiated approach to analyze the effects of fiscal decentralization. Under quite common
circumstances the reduction of poverty is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
reduction of income inequalities. The reduction of inequalities requires, in addition, that a lower
share of national income is received by the wealthier households. In order to reach this goal a
government requires the capacity to implement sizeable redistributive programs at the national
level. A progressive income tax schedule, for instance, might serve to directly alter the
distribution of income. A larger public sector share in GDP also facilitates pro-poor expenditure
programs at the central and sub-national levels and other expenditure programs that may also
benefit middle income groups directly (for example, college education or public health) or
indirectly (for example, higher levels of private income through productivity enhancing public
infrastructure). But, note that in order to become an effective redistributive tool, the government
sector (central and sub-national levels) must be a relevant player in the economy and rely on a
fairly well developed institutional framework. Finally, a more decentralized system of
government may overall leave the central government with less available resources to implement
distributional programs, if indeed central governments are more likely to focus on redistribution
objectives than sub-national governments; this scarcity of funds argument should be more valid in
situations where the government sector is relatively smaller. In this case, we could observe that
higher levels of fiscal decentralization can lead to higher inequality in the distribution of income.
In this context, we argue, the potential of fiscal decentralization to reduce income
inequalities may depend on the importance of the public sector in the overall economy. Sub-
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national governments generally do not have discretion over major tax bases, and generally they
are not expected to be able to reduce income inequalities through their tax policies. However, subnational governments might have an effective influence on income inequalities by using some of
their comparative advantages in the expenditure side of the public budget; or, at the least, the
negative impact of decentralization on income distribution because of the deviation of funds from
redistributive government policies may be neutralized when the presence of the public sector in
the economy is higher. In order to capture these nuances in our estimation we introduce in the
econometric specification an interaction term between the government size in GDP and fiscal
decentralization:
Gini it = b1 FD it + b2 FD it × Gov.Size it + B [Controls it] + e it
Among the controls we include a quadratic function of the log of per capita GDP to
represent the Kuznets’ hypothesis.56 Income levels are typically correlated with other factors like
the strength and quality of institutions, the rule of law, the development of the financial sector and
the labor markets, etc.; therefore, using the log of per capita GDP as a control variable allows us
to control for several other aspects of the socio-economic framework where the influence of fiscal
decentralization on income inequalities takes place.
As in the regressions for poverty, we include here population growth and the share of
urban population to account for changes in the demographic composition; we also include an
index of democracy to control for the possible impact of different political frameworks on income

56

The inclusion of the quadratic function of the log of per capita GDP has become a common practice in the
empirical literature on income inequalities. Some examples are Barro (2000), Thornton (2001) and BahmaniOskooee, Goswami and Mebratu (2006).
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distribution, and trade openness, a commonly used control variable in previous empirical analyses
of income inequalities.57
Table 2 presents the estimation results for income inequality. The first regression (column
1) is obtained with the fixed effects model, which controls for all unobservable specific-country
effects. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of fiscal decentralization indicates
that, by itself, fiscal decentralization worsens inequality in the distribution of income. However,
the negative and also significant coefficient for the interaction term between decentralization and
the size of the government sector indicates that the worsening effect of decentralization decreases
with government size and that, after the government reaches a sufficiently large size, fiscal
decentralization actually works to reduce inequalities. The government size at which fiscal
decentralization turns to be effective in reducing income inequalities is, as displayed at the bottom
of the table, equal to 18.2% of the GDP. Given the level of aggregation of our estimates and the
complexity of the direct and indirect effects through which decentralization may affect the
distribution of income we cannot be sure of how the net effect comes about. But, it is as if for
situations where the share of the government sector is relatively low, under 20 percent,
decentralization works to increase income inequality perhaps because scarce funds are deviated
from redistributive central government programs. For shares of the government sector in the
economy over 20 percent, fiscal decentralization works to decrease income inequality perhaps due
to the type of expenditure programs that can be implemented at the sub-national level in
combination with the fact that central government budgets are large enough to implement
redistribution programs.

57

We also tested the effect of left-leaning partisanship and several education variables; however, they did not display
significant effects on income inequalities. Given also that their inclusion reduces significantly our sample size, we do
not present here the results of those regressions.
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Table 2. The determinants of income distribution
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient based on disposable income (plus gross income Gini measures)

Fiscal Decentralization (%)
Interaction term
(F.Decent.× Government size)
Government size (% GDP)
Log of per capita GDP
Log of per capita GDP squared
Population growth (%)
Urban population (%)
Index of democracy
Openness to international trade
dummy Gross-income Gini measure

Fixed Effects
regression

Random Effects
GLS regression

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.237 **
(0.109)
-0.013 **
(0.006)
0.194
(0.129)
51.519 ***
(13.947)
-3.014 ***
(0.785)
0.771
(0.700)
-0.057
(0.098)
0.019
(0.013)
-0.021
(0.016)
4.867 **
(2.291)

0.284 ***
(0.106)
-0.016 ***
(0.005)
0.243 **
(0.121)
64.432 ***
(11.716)
-3.865 ***
(0.656)
2.765 ***
(0.784)
0.045
(0.047)
0.023 *
(0.013)
-0.021 *
(0.012)
6.564 ***
(1.535)

0.324 ***
(0.087)
-0.015 ***
(0.004)
0.258 **
(0.118)
51.585 ***
(10.769)
-3.013 ***
(0.598)
1.688 ***
(0.532)
-0.046
(0.043)
0.024 *
(0.012)

1.143 **
(0.559)
-0.057 **
(0.028)
1.017 **
(0.509)
63.872 ***
(14.790)
-3.798 ***
(0.885)
1.429 *
(0.804)
-0.030
(0.049)
0.015
(0.018)

-179.302 ***
(61.518)

-234.603 ***
(52.091)

0.308 ***
(0.088)
-0.015 ***
(0.004)
0.260 **
(0.117)
51.298 ***
(10.741)
-2.985 ***
(0.597)
1.632 ***
(0.544)
-0.049
(0.043)
0.024 **
(0.012)
-0.017
(0.011)
6.598 ***
(1.399)
10.575 ***
(3.026)
13.351 ***
(1.906)
-187.440 ***
(47.851)

6.475 ***
(1.398)
10.495 ***
(3.066)
13.525 ***
(1.865)
-189.414 ***
(47.991)

7.297 ***
(1.413)
9.068 ***
(2.557)
12.663 ***
(1.880)
-250.637 ***
(67.288)
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213
56

213
56

213
56

213
56

143.87
0.0000

332.31
0.0000

333.37
0.0000

364.26
0.0000

0.3428
0.7238
0.7048

0.3651
0.8461
0.8212

0.3555
0.8465
0.8206

0.2485
0.7665
0.7429

38.638
0.0007

18.024
0.2614

17.939
0.2096

0.126
0.7224

5,149

4,169

5,392

5,221

4,486

18.2

17.8

20.5

21.6

20.1

dummy Sub-Saharan Africa
dummy Latin America & Caribbean
Constant

Observations
Number of countries
Wald test
p-value
R-square within
R-square between
R-square overall

0.3767
0.5976
0.5886

Test of overidentifying restrictions
p-value
Max. Kuznets’ curve (year 2000 US$)
Maximum FD effect
(in terms of government size)

Random Effects Random Effects
GLS regression GLS regression

G2SLS
Random Effects
IV regression a
(5)

a

The instruments for expenditure decentralization and its interaction term are the log of area (square
kilometers), log of population times the developing country tummy and, openness to international trade.
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include year’s dummies (not shown)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

For the other control variables, the Kuznets hypothesis is strongly supported by the
estimates in Table 2. On average, the Gini coefficient increases in the first stages of development
and after a certain level of per capita GDP is reached, income inequality starts to decrease. The
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maximum point of the Kuznets’ curve, under the fixed effects model, is US$5,149 dollars per
capita (in prices of year 2000). Countries with a lower (greater) level of per capita income tend to
experience greater (lower) income inequalities as they grow. Regarding the other control
variables, none of them display a statistically significant effect on income inequalities in the fixed
effects regression.58
For completeness we present in the second column of Table 2 the random effects GLS
estimations obtained by using the same variables considered in the fixed effects regression. But,
even though most of the control variables gain in terms of statistical significance, the test of
overidentifying restrictions suggests that the random effects model wrongly assumes that the
explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the country-specific error.
In column (3) of Table 2 we present an additional random effects GLS estimation, which
incorporates dummy controls for two regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean. These dummy variables allow us to partially control for country-specific effects, such
that the random effects’ assumption is correctly applied to the new specification. Indeed, the two
regional dummies are significant at the 1%, suggesting that a great deal of the country-specific
error has a regional component. This assertion is supported by the test of overidentifying
restrictions, which with a p-value of 0.2614 fails to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation
between the independent variables and the country-specific error. The random effects regression
with dummy regional control variables, therefore, seems to provide consistent and efficient
estimators.

58

But note that interestingly the dummy controlling of gross income measures of the Gini coefficient is significant at
the 5% level, and it is relevant magnitude with a positive sign. In average, gross income measures of the Gini
coefficient are systematically greater than disposable income measures. Since the differences between gross and
disposable income measures are mostly explained by tax payments, this result suggests that the tax policy has an
effective redistributive character.
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The random effects regression of equation (3) confirms that the effect of fiscal
decentralization on income inequalities depend on the size of government. The point at which
fiscal decentralization starts reducing income inequalities is defined for a government size of
20.5% of the GDP. The Kuznets’ hypothesis is confirmed again, and the maximum point of the
Kuznets’ curve is reduced to US$5,392. Other control variables turn out to have a significant
effect on income inequalities under this specification. The size of government, by itself, increases
income inequalities. This finding helps clarify the active role of sub-national governments in
contributing to the reduction of income inequalities, as opposed of playing a passive indirect role
of reducing more or less the ability of the central government to implement national redistributive
programs.
As discussed earlier, there are good reasons to suspect that fiscal decentralization may be
an endogenous variable. Differences in income distribution may help shape preferences for fiscal
decentralization and the actual extent of its implementation. If fiscal decentralization is
endogenous then the estimates obtained from fixed effects and random effects (GLS) models in
Table 2 might be biased.
Given that the random effects regression in column (3) is presumably making correct
assumptions about the correlation of regressors and the specific-country error, we can use the
(random effects) generalized two-stage (instrumental variables) least squares (G2SLS) model as a
framework to analyze the possible endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. Note that time-invariant
variables are not dropped in random effects models, thus we can use time-invariant instrumental
variables. Two out of the three instruments used represent the size of the country.59 The size of
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Among many others, Beramendi (2003) uses ethnic fractionalization to instrument fiscal decentralization also in
the context of its effects on income inequalities. Ethnic fractionalization, however, is highly correlated with the Gini
coefficient in our sample, thus it does not meet the basic requirements of a good instrument for fiscal
decentralization.
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the country does not seem to be related with income distribution, but it has been identified as an
important determinant of fiscal decentralization. The size of the country is represented by the log
of geographical area (measured as square kilometers) and the interaction term between the log of
population and the developing country dummy. 60 The costs of centralized service provision can
be expected to increase with the geographical size of the country, and thus also the justification
for decentralized expenditure responsibilities. 61 The interaction term between the log of
population and the developing country dummy allows us to control for the effects that population
on fiscal decentralization only in the context of developing countries. Within de sub-sample of
developing countries, we argue, the movement towards fiscal decentralization might be partially
explained by the need for improving efficiency in public service delivery for vast populations; but
note that the size of the population itself has not played any important role in determining the
distribution of income.62 In addition, provided that openness to international trade has been shown
no to be a significant determinant of income inequalities in our sample, and that it may be at the
same time a good predictor of fiscal decentralization, we also use it as an instrument for fiscal
decentralization.63 The possible effects of openness on fiscal decentralization and income
inequalities are several, but the net result is uncertain. Here we argue that the positive and
negative effects that openness might have on income inequalities, as revealed by the random
effect regression of column (3), tend to cancel out. In contrast, openness might be associated with

60

Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) show that the area of the country and population are both important determinants of
fiscal decentralization.
61
Panizza (1999) offers strong support for the positive effect of area on fiscal decentralization. An example of the use
of geographical area as an instrument for fiscal decentralization is given by Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006).
62
Among developing countries, the correlation between the log of population and fiscal decentralization is 0.46,
while the correlation between the log of population and the Gini coefficient is 0.09. The same argument might not be
applicable to developed countries, where the efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization can be expected to be
lower.
63
The correlation between openness to trade with respect to fiscal decentralization and the Gini coefficient is -0.24
and -0.11, respectively. In addition, the coefficient of openness to trade is negative and significant at the 1% level in
the regressions of fiscal decentralization and its interaction term on the full set of exogenous variables.
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a lower ability to carry out stabilization policies, and therefore with a central government more
reluctant to transfer tax and expenditure powers to the sub-national level.64 The exclusion of
openness to trade does not significantly affect the results of the random effects estimations, which
are presented in column (4). Again, the test of overidentifying restrictions (with a p-value of
0.2096) fails to reject the null that the random effects’ assumption is valid.
The generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS) regression results are presented in
column (5) of Table 2. In the context of the G2SLS the test for overidentifying restrictions is a
test on the null hypothesis that the excluded exogenous variables are valid instruments. The pvalue of the test is 0.7224, which means that this hypothesis cannot be rejected and that the set of
instruments is adequate.
The G2SLS results in column (5) shows that our previous results about the significance of
fiscal decentralization and the functional form of its influence on income distribution are robust to
the correction for possible endogeneity bias. The coefficients of fiscal decentralization and its
interaction term with the size of government remain highly significant, while the size of
government that maximizes the redistributive effect of fiscal decentralization is set at 20.1% of
the GDP, which is very close to the previous results.

Summary and Conclusions

Currently, many countries around the world are simultaneously embarked in active policies
involving poverty reduction and improvements in the distribution of income, on the one hand, and
fiscal decentralization reform, on the other hand. It is important to clarify the extent to which
these policy thrusts are complementary or may be working against each other.
64

For more detailed discussions see, for example, Prud’homme (1994) and de Mello (2005).
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To research this question this paper explores the wide array of possible effects that fiscal
decentralization policy may have on poverty and income distribution outcomes. First, we draw up
a conceptual framework to distinguish between direct and indirect effects of fiscal
decentralization on poverty and income distribution outcomes. Direct effects are those that can be
associated with changes in fiscal policies or behavioral responses with a direct redistributive
impact. In contrast, indirect effects include mostly macroeconomic outcomes, such as economic
growth, macroeconomic stability and so on, that can be important in determining poverty levels
and the distribution of income and that can plausible be affected by fiscal decentralization.
Although interesting and suggestive, the relationships between decentralization, poverty
and income distribution are many and complex and often they are quite likely to work in opposite
directions. Therefore, it is not possible a priori to anticipate what may be the net impact of fiscal
decentralization on poverty and inequality, largely making it an empirical question.
We use a large international panel dataset covering the past three decades to test to what
extent fiscal decentralization affects poverty and income distribution outcomes. Besides fiscal
decentralization measures, the econometric specifications include other control variables that have
been found in the previous literature to be relevant determinants of poverty and inequality of
income distribution.
The analysis uses three different definitions of poverty: the headcount ratio, the poverty
gap, and the Human Development Index (HDI). When using the headcount ratio and the poverty
gap as the dependent variable we do not find a statistically significant effect for fiscal
decentralization; this is possibly due to the limited number of observations available when using
those definitions of poverty. For the the case of HDI as the dependent variable, fiscal
decentralization is found to have a non linear effect on poverty. When sub-national governments
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represent one-third or less of total public expenditures fiscal decentralization appears to be
instrumental in reducing poverty levels; however, higher levels of decentralization lead to
increases in poverty. Many of the public services assigned as responsibilities to sub-national
governments have the potential of improving the standard of living of poor households by, for
example, creating access to basic services such as primary education and basic health or better
targeting aid. However, it is as if at higher levels of decentralization the fiscal resources left at the
central level may be too scarce for implementing effective national anti-poverty programs.
With respect to the distribution of income, we find that the impact of fiscal
decentralization on income inequalities depends on the size of government. When the overall
government is relatively small in the economy, higher levels of decentralization may deviate
resources that otherwise may be used at the national level in redistributive programs and subnational budgets may too small anyway to include expenditure programs with redistributive
impact. But with overall government budgets around 20 percent of GDP of higher we find a
robust effect of fiscal decentralization contributing to decreased inequality in the distribution of
income. Given that the sub-national governments are usually constrained in their capacity to
implement progressive tax policies, their comparative advantage with respect to the central
government is centered in the expenditure side of the budget, and particularly, in their ability to
target the poor.
The findings of the analysis about the influence of fiscal decentralization on income
inequalities are fairly compatible with our findings about the effects of fiscal decentralization on
poverty. These results provide consistent evidence about the significant role played in practice by
sub-national governments in the reduction of poverty and inequalities.
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The findings of this paper suggest that in the international experience sub-national
governments can play directly or indirectly a significant role in poverty alleviation outcomes and
improving the overall distribution of income. However, these findings do not fit easily with the
traditional normative recommendation in the theory of fiscal federalism that redistribution policy
should be exclusively the reserve of central governments. One way to make the findings fit within
the conventional theory is to note that the key assumption of household mobility behind the
normative recommendation is not met in reality in many countries. Another possibility is that the
direct distributional policies of sub-national governments in many countries do not differ in fact
that much from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in which case no significant migration movements are
induced (poorer households into and richer households out of jurisdictions with more
redistribution) and positive redistribution outcomes are feasible and sustainable at the subnational level. One final possibility, also explaining the results found in this paper is that poverty
alleviation and income distribution outcomes are more the result of indirect effects of fiscal
decentralization as opposed to open direct policies of sub-national governments. In this case, our
findings in the paper would be perfectly compatible with the normative recommendation in the
conventional theory of public finance. Which of these possible explanations is more accurate
should be the subject of further future research.
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ESSAY II: ON THE SECOND BEST SOLUTION TO
THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES’ PROBLEM

Introduction

The normative theory of public expenditures attempts to determine the (optimal) combination of
public and private goods that a benevolent and omniscient government would choose in order to
maximize social welfare. The traditional approach to this problem distinguishes between the firstbest scenario, in which non-distortionary lump-sum taxation is available to the policymaker, and
the second-best scenario, in which the government must rely on others inefficient or distortionary
tax instruments. The traditional first-best solution to the welfare maximization problem is
described by the Samuelson’s (1954) condition.65 In the presence of economic distortions,
however, the first-best solution is not feasible and the Samuelson’s condition must be adjusted in
order to describe the optimal second-best solution to the government problem. The appropriate
adjustment has been the main focus of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) literature.66 The
MCF is defined as the welfare costs associated with raising a marginal amount of tax revenue
collections, and the normative prescription for public expenditure decisions is usually referred to
in this literature as the MCF rule.67

65

The Samuelson’s condition states that the optimal amount of public expenditures corresponds to a point where the
sum of the marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods for all taxpayers is equal to the marginal
rate of transformation between public and private goods.
66
Some relevant papers focused on developing and clarifying the concept of the MCF are Browning (1976), Wildasin
(1984) and Ballard and Fullerton (1992).
67
According to the MCF rule, at the optimal amount of public expenditures the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution between public and private goods is no longer equal to the marginal rate of transformation between
public and private goods. In order to account for the distortions imposed in the economy, the marginal rate of
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In this paper we show that the traditional MCF rule does not necessarily maximizes
welfare in a second-best scenario. We begin by introducing a new analytical tool, the “effective
budget constraint” for the government, which shows the set of affordable combinations of public
and private goods at any possible tax rate for any tax instrument. The effective budget constraint
captures the positive restrictions imposed by taxpayers’ behavioral responses on the amount of
revenues that the government is able to collect through its tax policy. By itself, this analytical tool
does not represent a conceptual innovation because it can be readily derived in the traditional
framework of the government problem. However, we show in this paper that the effective budget
constraint plays a key role in determining the optimal solution to the government problem.
The basic argument we use to show that the traditional MCF rule does not maximize
social welfare is a simple one. In the traditional time allocation model, taxpayers do not take into
account the marginal benefits of taxation on their behavioral responses to taxation. In contrast, in
the traditional welfare maximization problem the benevolent and omniscient government fully
considers the marginal benefits received by taxpayers from the public goods. Thus, it is assumed
that the government is able to use information about the welfare benefits of taxation that
taxpayers ignore in their individual labor supply responses to taxation. In the traditional
framework an omniscient government would know that labor effort does not only provide the
taxpayers with income to purchase private goods, but that the labor effort also serves to finance
public goods that are valuable for the taxpayers. This implies that whenever taxpayers do not fully
account for the marginal benefits of taxation on their behavioral responses to taxes, the
omniscient government would know that the taxpayers’ first order conditions would
underestimate the marginal benefits from labor effort or the “true” opportunity cost of leisure.

transformation must be multiplied by the MCF, defined as the marginal welfare cost of taxation divided by marginal
revenue collections.

58
The traditional MCF literature does not consider the fact that taxpayers fail to recognize
the true opportunity cost of leisure and computes the MCF rule by simply substituting the
taxpayers’ first order conditions into the first order conditions of the government problem. As a
consequence, the traditional measure of the MCF underestimates the marginal welfare costs of tax
revenue collections.
In this paper we propose an alternative to the second best solution to the government
problem. The alternative solution is described by a point where the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution between public and private goods is equal to the slope of the effective budget
constraint. Accordingly, we also propose to redefine the concept of MCF as the slope of the
effective budget constraint.
In addition, in this paper we also show that the analytical framework used to describe the
second-best solution to the government problem can also be used to explain actual government
behavior. In particular, we show that the flypaper effect, an empirical regularity that has for long
challenged the traditional theory, can easily be obtained as a prediction within our framework.
The flypaper effect is characterized by a situation where lump-sum transfers to a local
government increase the amount of local public expenditures by more than an equivalent amount
of income increases received by the residents in the same jurisdiction. Considering that the lumpsum transfers received by the local government do not have tax collection costs, the recipient
government is able to increase public expenditures while enjoying lower marginal costs of tax
collections. The same response is not necessarily possible under transfers to individuals, because
in that case the government must fully face the increasing marginal costs of tax collections. The
importance of this application is that it suggests that the normative and positive approaches to the
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government problem, thus far separated in the traditional theory, can be integrated in one simple
general framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present a general
definition of the effective budget constraint and show its dependence on taxpayers’ behavioral
responses to taxation. The third section focuses on the second-best solution to the government
problem. Here we briefly explain the traditional approach to the problem and show the corrections
that are necessary to the traditional concept of the marginal cost of funds. In the forth section we
use our framework of analysis to explain the flypaper effect. The last section concludes.

The Effective Budget Constraint of the Government

In this section we briefly explain the relationship between the taxpayers’ labor supply responses
to a proportional labor income tax and the affordable combinations of public and private goods.
Our goal is to provide a general definition of the effective budget constraint of the government. By
itself, the effective budget constraint does not represent a conceptual innovation because it can be
directly derived from the conventional framework of the government problem. However, it has
not yet been explicitly described in the literature.68
We assume that public expenditure on a pure public good ( ) is entirely financed via a
proportional tax on labor income. We assume that a change in the proportional labor income tax
rate ( ) affects the supply of labor ( ), which in turn determines the size of the tax base ( ). We

68

The budget constraint of the government is traditionally characterized as a straight (minus one slope) line
representing a costless transfer of private income to the public sector. That representation does not account for the
fact that the taxpayers do respond to taxes, altering the tax base and imposing an implicit cost on the transfer of
private income to the public sector.
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define the effective tax base as the amount of private income that is available for tax collections
after the taxpayers’ behavioral responses have taken place:
,
where

(1)

is the wage rate and an asterisk represent the taxpayers’ optimal choices. The effective

tax base and the amount of tax revenue collections ( ) are fully determined by the taxpayers’
responses to taxation, and they can therefore be expressed as functions of . If we assume that the
government spends all tax revenues on the public good

during the period they are collected,

then the maximum feasible level of public expenditures is given by: 69
max

.

(2)

In addition, the effective tax base also determines the amount of income available to
finance private consumption, denoted here by
(after tax) income, 1

and assumed to be equal to the sum of disposable

, plus the total amount of non-labor income,

.

Given that both tax revenues and private consumption are functions of , for each value of
the tax rate
tax collections

0,1 the taxpayers’ utility maximizing behavior leads to a unique combination of
and optimal private consumption

. Now we can formally define the

effective budget constraint of the government as the set of points described generically by
,

for any given value of

0,1 . This set can be represented in the public-private

goods plane by a function whose shape ultimately depends on the tax elasticity of labor supply as
well as on the exogenous parameters of the model.

69

The costs of tax administration and enforcement are omitted to simplify the analysis. These costs would directly
reduce the amount of public goods that can be provided for any given level of tax revenues, and thus tightening the
budget constraint of the government. Even though their inclusion is important in order to fully describe the costs of
tax collections, in this paper we focus on different aspects of the solution to the government problem that have not
been consider till now, and leave tax administration costs as an extension of the discussion developed in the paper.
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The taxpayer problem and the effective budget constraint of the government

Individual utility

is represented by a quasi-concave utility function, which increases in the

individual’s consumption of the private good

and the pure public good , and decreases with

the individual supply of labor .70 Each taxpayer chooses his optimal labor supply , while and
remain exogenous to his decision. Assuming no savings, the utility maximizing taxpayer must
exhaust his income by consuming private goods and contributing to the provision of public goods.
The representative taxpayer’s maximization problem can be written as:
max
where

1

, ,

,

(3)

represents the amount of non-labor income, assumed to be exogenous and untaxed, and

1

is the individual budget constraint. The first order condition for individual

welfare maximization, as described in the traditional labor supply literature, is given by:
1

0 ,

(4)

where the subscripts represent derivatives with respect to the designated variable. This first order
condition implicitly defines the individual labor supply
taxpayer’s optimal level of private consumption,
government,

. Assuming that there are

, which in turn determines both the

, and the amount of taxes he pays to the

identical taxpayers, the aggregate amounts of

private consumption and tax revenue collections can readily be obtained as

and

.
Moreover, based on the representative taxpayer’s budget constraint, the effect of an
increase of the tax rate on aggregate private consumption is described by:
1
70

,

(5)

Throughout the paper the individual parameters are represented by lowercases, while the aggregate values are
represented with uppercases.
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which is assumed to be negative. Similarly, from equation 2 we can express the marginal effect of
on tax revenue collections as:
,

(6)

which depends on the relative sizes of the effective tax base and the behavioral responses to
taxation.71
The effective budget constraint of a benevolent and omniscient government choosing the
optimal combination of public and private goods is illustrated in Figure 3. The vertical axis
represents aggregate private consumption

and the horizontal axis represents the government tax

revenues . While a higher usually reduces private consumption vertically, government
revenues increase horizontally towards the right as a result of larger tax collections; however, tax
collections might eventually decrease towards the left when tax collections become negatively
related to the tax rate. The figure shows the changes in consumption and tax collections given
four possible levels of the tax rate under the assumption that the labor supply response to taxation
is negative. We start with a statutory tax rate equal to zero, and then we increase it gradually to
,

, and finally to

1.

Point P0, located at 0,
private consumption when

0

in Figure 3, corresponds to the optimum level of aggregate

0. Aggregate private consumption must be equal to the sum of the

effective tax base and the aggregate level of non-labor income

, defined as

P0P1, which can be referred to as the (effective) “tax base line” given

. The line

0, corresponds to the

traditional representation of the government budget constraint, which is a minus-one (constant)
sloped function representing a costless transfer of private income to the government for any given
level of the tax rate. In the absence of behavioral responses to taxation a positive tax rate
71

would

, thus subsequent increases of the tax rate might plausibly lead
Negative labor responses imply a reduction of
| |, from which the total amount of revenues decreases with .
to a point where
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lead to the point P2 in Figure 3, where the amounts of tax revenues and private consumption are
equal to

0 and 1

0

, respectively. However, once the effective tax base is

allowed to change with the transfer of private income to the government is no longer costless.
The resulting decrease in labor supply reduces the effective tax base from

0 to

, as

represented by a shift of the tax base line from the P0P1 to P3P4 .

Figure 3. Diagrammatic derivation of the effective budget constraint
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Under
P5, where

the affordable combination of public and private goods is given by the point
and

1

. Note that, as a result of the

reduction of the effective tax base, point P2 is no longer feasible.72 Therefore, point P5 (not P2) is
the relevant constraint describing the affordable combination of public and private goods, and

The vertical distance between P2 and P5 corresponds precisely to the marginal change in after-tax income that
results from the labor supply response to the tax rate. Indeed, using equation 5 in its discrete form, the vertical
1
. The first term in the right hand side corresponds
distance between P0 and P5 is equal to
to the vertical distance between P0 and P2, while the second to the vertical distance between P2 and P5. Similarly, the
–the
discrete form of equation 6 serves to decompose the horizontal distance between P0 and P5 as the sum of
–the horizontal distance between P2 and P5.
horizontal distance between P0 and P2, and
72
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thus the line P0P5 can be considered as a segment of the effective budget constraint derived for a
discrete change in the tax rate equal to

.

Following an identical procedure, a higher tax rate
further, from

reduces the effective tax base even

, which leads to a new shift of the tax base line to P6P7, where the

to

point P8 is also shown to belong to the effective budget constraint. Finally, when
base line shifts to P9P10. Since at

1 the tax

1 the effective tax base is fully devoted to financing

government revenues, then P10 represents the ending point of the effective budget constraint,
where private consumption is equal to the aggregate amount of (untaxed) non-labor income. The
effective budget constraint is defined discretely by P0, P5, P8 and P10, and the set of points
connecting them.
Given that the aggregate amount of private consumption
revenue collections

and the maximum level of

are both defined as functions of , the slope of the effective budget

constraint, denoted here as , can be computed for any value of

0,1 as:
1

.

(7)

Provided that private consumption decreases with , the slope of the effective budget constraint is
negative as long as has a positive effect on tax revenues. In particular, if and only if the
behavioral responses to taxation are nil for all

0,1 , then

1 along the entire effective

budget constraint, which would be identical to the tax base line P0P1, drawn for

0.

Moreover, the curvature of the budget constraint can further be analyzed by taking the first
derivative of

with respect to :73
.

73

See derivation in Appendix IV.

(8)
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Assuming for simplicity that

0, for any value of

0 the right hand side of equation 8 is

negative, implying that the effective budget constraint is concave in with respect to the origin.
Only in the special case where

0, the right hand side of equation 8 is zero, and the effective

budget constraint displays no curvature.74

The Second-best Solution to the Government Problem

The optimal combination of public expenditures and private consumption should be determined
by maximizing social welfare subject to the set of affordable combinations of public and private
goods. In this section we briefly review the traditional normative approach to the government
problem. Our goal is to show that the second-best solution provided by the literature on the
marginal costs of funds (MCF) can be considered suboptimal. The reason for this is that the
traditional MCF literature does not exploit the information advantage that the government has
regarding the marginal benefits derived from the provision of the public good. While the
conventional treatment of the time allocation problem assumes that taxpayers do not account for
the marginal benefits of public goods’ provision in their labor supply decisions, the government is
assumed to fully consider those benefits in the social maximization problem. The problem arises
in that the traditional MCF rule solves the government’s problem by assuming that the
government bases its decision on the taxpayers’ first order condition, thus ignoring the marginal
benefits of taxation and providing incomplete information about the taxpayers’ preferences.
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Note that by rotating the diagram of figure 1 in 90 degrees to the left we can represent an increase on the tax rate as
a rightwards movement on the horizontal axis (equivalent to a reduction of private consumption), while the vertical
axis still represents the amount of taxes that the government is able to collect. In such a framework a negatively
sloped effective budget constraint would correspond precisely to the increasing portion of the (inverted U-shaped)
Laffer curve. Furthermore, if preferences are convex in the relevant range, then a welfare maximizing government
will always choose a combination of public and private goods in the increasing portion of the Laffer curve.
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We will show that the optimal solution to the government problem corresponds to the
point of tangency between the effective budget constraint and the highest attainable level of social
welfare. Based on this result we propose a refinement of the normative prescription for public
expenditures and a consequent modification of the MCF concept.

The traditional approach to the government problem

The fundamental standpoint from which allocation efficiency is defined and analyzed in public
finance theory is a first-best scenario where there are no distortions. Samuelson (1954) shows that
if the government acts as a benevolent and omniscient policymaker (and if lump-sum taxation is
available), then social welfare is maximized by the level of pure public goods for which the sum
of marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods, ∑
marginal rate of transformation,

, is equal to the

. Following Samuelson’s seminal contribution, the literature

has emphasized several aspects of the government problem that are relevant in a second-best
context, and which call for the adjustment of the Samuelson condition by a factor called the
marginal cost of funds (MCF):75
∑

·

.

(9)

The MCF is broadly defined as the welfare cost of rising one dollar of additional revenue
and is typically measured in terms of private consumption. The precise measure of the MCF and
its meaning, however, depends on the framework of analysis. Musgrave (1959) distinguished
between differential incidence, meant to compare the costs (or distributive effects) associated with
two revenue sources of equal yield, and balanced-budget incidence, in which the additional

75

See, for instance, Ballard and Fullerton (1992). A recent comprehensive review of the MCF theory and its
empirical applications is provided by Dahlby (2008).
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revenues exactly finance a new expenditure program.76 Musgrave’s distinction is used by Ballard
and Fullerton (1992) to clarify the differences between two different branches in the MCF
literature. First, the Pigou-Harberger-Browning tradition is associated with the concept of
differential incidence analysis. This branch uses non-distortionary lump-sum taxes as a
benchmark to compute the deadweight loss associated with the substitution effects imposed by
any other tax instrument. Since the income effect is in this case irrelevant, the measures of welfare
costs are based exclusively on compensated supply and demand functions, making the MCF by
definition equal or greater than one. Second, the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern tradition is
associated with the balanced-budget approach to the measurement of welfare costs of taxation,
which is the natural framework of cost-benefit analysis (Fullerton 1991). Here both the
substitution and the income effects must be considered because they are equally important in
determining whether a project should be undertaken or not. This measure of the MCF is based on
uncompensated demand and supply functions. In the case of a labor income tax, the MCF may
plausibly be less than one if the income effect in the labor supply is big enough to counterbalance
the substitution effect. In this context, the measure of welfare costs based on uncompensated labor
supply boils down to a measure of the sensitivity of the tax base and revenue collections with
respect to changes in the tax rate. In this paper we focus on the costs faced by the government in
collecting revenues via a proportional labor income tax, so we implicitly follow the second
tradition.
The government problem consists of determining the tax rate on labor income that
maximizes social welfare, subject to the taxpayers’ behavioral responses to taxation. In turn, the
optimal labor income tax rate simultaneously solves for the optimal amounts of public goods
76

Discussions about the differential and balanced-budget approaches in the context of the MCF can be found, among
others, in Ballard (1990) and Ballard and Fullerton (1992). The distinction between the two approaches was
previously discussed by Stuart (1983) and Wildasin (1984).
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and private consumption . Assuming that the welfare function is utilitarian and that there are
identical taxpayers, the traditional formulation of the government problem is:
max Ω

1

,

where Ω represents social welfare and

,

,

(10)

. The first order condition for this problem

is given by:
1
where

0,

(11)

denotes the aggregate labor response to taxation. Using the first order condition for the

taxpayers’ labor supply decision in equation 4, the first order condition for the government
problem can be reduced to:
0.

(12)

Rearranging terms we derive the traditional normative prescription for the optimal amount of
public goods:
,
where

/

(13)

represents the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between public and

private goods for all taxpayers. Equation 13 corresponds to the adjusted Samuelson condition
presented in equation 9, which has been simplified by assuming a marginal rate of transformation
equal to one. The right hand side of this equation is equal to the MCF, whose formal definition is
usually presented as:77
1
1 1

77

1
,

1

,

,

(14)

References to this definition can be found, among others, in Mayshar (1991), Håkonsen (1998), and Auerbach and
Hines (2002).
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where

,

and

,

are the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply and the uncompensated

tax elasticity of labor supply, respectively. 78 In particular, the term

is referred to as the change

in consumer welfare or the marginal welfare costs of taxation, and it corresponds to the loss of
equivalent non-labor income imposed by the tax. In order to compute this cost, we can first
assume that non-labor income is endogenous in the labor supply decision (equation 3) and then
obtain the corresponding taxpayer’s first order condition for any given change in tax policy:
1
where

0.

(15)

represents the marginal loss of equivalent non-labor income due to a change in .

Provided that the first order condition of the labor supply decision in equation 4 is satisfied,
equation 15 can be reduced to

, or the individual change in consumer welfare measured

in accordance with the individual perception of welfare.79

Sub-optimality of the traditional solution to the government problem

Thus far we have, separately, characterized the effective budget constraint and reviewed the
traditional approach to the government problem, which leads to a solution that is formally
described by the MCF concept. Both the slope of the effective budget constraint (equation 7) and
the MCF (equation 14) measure the marginal cost of tax collections. However, the former
measures this cost in terms of the amount of private consumption forgone and the latter in terms
of the welfare costs of taxation. In the following discussion we will show that the solution implied
Given that the tax rate is simply a correction of the disposable wage rate, then
1
/
, which implies
that
/ 1
/
1
/
/
1
/
1
/
/
/
,
, .
79
Even though the expression
can be interpreted as the total labor income of the taxpayer, it is important to
can also be written as
/ , and
recognize that it refers to the marginal change in consumer’s welfare. Indeed,
, we can also write
· , such that the (discrete) equivalent change of welfare due to a change
from
in the tax rate,
, is equal to
· , or the total labor income of the taxpayer multiplied by the change of the tax
rate.
78
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by the MCF is sub-optimal, and that the welfare maximizing solution to the government problem
requires the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods to be
equal to the negative value of the slope of the effective budget constraint.
With labor income taxation, both the slope of the effective budget constraint and the MCF
can be analyzed diagrammatically in the context of the labor market. In Figure 4(a) we represent a
linear and positively sloped (uncompensated) aggregate labor supply function
is usually done, that the wage rate

, and assume, as

is exogenous and that the labor demand function

is

perfectly elastic.80
When

0 the optimum amount of labor supplied in the market is found at point p0, at

the intersection of the labor supply and the labor demand functions; and the size of the effective
tax base

0 is given by the rectangle 0 w p0 L*(0). Once a tax rate

0 is imposed, taxpayers

adjust their labor supply to L*(t1) and, as a result, marginal tax collections are equal to the sum of
the areas A1, A2, and A3. Note that since marginal tax collections serve as the denominator of the
slope of the effective budget constraint as well as the MCF rule, the difference between the two
concepts is observed only in the numerator.
The numerator of the slope of the effective budget constraint measures the full reduction
in private consumption resulting from a marginal change in the tax rate, represented in Figure 4(a)
as the sum of the areas A1, A2 and A3, plus the area A4 . 81 In contrast, the MCF only accounts for

80

A similar representation of the MCF is provided, for example, in Boadway and Wildasin (1984, 393-395). For
convenience, all measurements in Figure 2(a) correspond to those of Figure 1, and the points are numbered
consistently to show the equivalence between the two frameworks. Due to the change in dimensions, however, the
correspondence in terms of private (public) goods is observed by comparing the vertical (horizontal) value of each
uppercase point P in Figure 1 with the cumulative area at the left and below (left and above) each lowercase point p
in figure 2(a).
81
The grey rectangles in the graph correspond to marginal variations that cannot be assigned in a discrete analysis
like the one presented here. In any case, in the limit, when the change of the tax rate approaches to zero, these areas
are negligible.
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the reduction in consumer welfare, given by the sum of the areas A1, A2 and A3. 82 The MCF does
not consider the labor-induced change in disposable income (area A4) as a welfare cost of taxation
because, according to the taxpayers’ first order condition (equation 4), any welfare loss due to a
decrease in disposable income is always perfectly offset by the welfare gains associated with
longer leisure time.83

Figure 4. The marginal welfare costs of taxation and the solution to the government problem
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In general, for any value of , the vertical distance below the labor supply function
represents the amount of disposable income forgone with a marginal increase in the tax rate, and
its welfare equivalence is correctly defined as the negative value of the welfare gain associated
with the reduction of labor effort. The first order condition of the taxpayers’ problem does not,
82

According to equation 5 the discrete change in private consumption following the first increase in the tax rate can
0
1
, where 1
is the labor-induced change on disposable
be represented by
income.
83
Subsequent increases in the labor income tax rate allow us to observe, in addition, the erosion of tax collections that
result from marginal reductions of the labor supply. When the tax rate increases to the labor supplied is reduced to
L*(t2) and tax collections grow in an amount equal to the sum of the areas A5 and A6, minus the area A3. Area A3 is
usually referred to as “revenue leakage,” because it corresponds to tax revenues previously collected, but lost due to
the reduction of the labor supplied. In any case, the revenue effect of a marginal change in the tax rate is accounted
for identically by the slope of the effective budget constraint and the MCF, thus the revenue leakage has no role in
explaining the differences between the two measures of the marginal cost of tax collections.
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however, provide sufficient information to maximize welfare as the traditional MCF literature
presumes. Any additional units of leisure time reduce not only the amount of income available to
purchase private goods (as suggested by the taxpayers’ first order condition of equation 4) but
also the amount of tax revenues collected by the government.
In Table 3 we compare the taxpayers’ labor decision with the government’s expenditure
decision, and show that they lead to a different computation of the opportunity cost of leisure.
Given that in the taxpayers’ problem (equation 3) the amount of public goods is determined
exogenously, their first order conditions (equation 4) do not consider the welfare effects of a
change in public goods’ provision. As a consequence, the labor decisions are based exclusively on
their ability to purchase private goods, and the opportunity cost of leisure is defined accordingly
as the marginal after-tax income, 1

. In contrast, in the government problem (equation 10)

the amount of public expenditures is assumed to be determined by both the tax rate and the labor
response to taxation. In this case the first order condition of the government problem (equation
11) captures not only the effect of the taxpayers’ labor supply responses to taxation on private
consumption, but also on the public good. This means that the traditional theory implicitly
assumes that the government is able to capture more information about the consequences of labor
decisions on taxpayers’ welfare than taxpayers do in their own labor decisions.
The opportunity cost of leisure as computed by the government is presented in the table as
equation (*), which is directly derived from its first order condition in equation 11. Note in
equation (*) that under plausible values for the sum of marginal rate of substitutions between
public and private goods (

/

of leisure is greater than 1

84

For instance, if 1

2 and 1

) and the tax elasticity of labor supply
.84

,

0.5, then 1

.

,

the opportunity cost
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Table 3. Taxpayers’ and government’s computations of the opportunity cost of leisure
Taxpayers’ labor decision:
Problem:

max

First order
condition:

1

Opportunity
cost of leisure:

1

, ,
0

Government expenditures’ decision :
(3)

max Ω

1

(4)
1

1

1

1

,

,

0 ; where
;
1

1

(10)
(11)
(5,6)
(*)

,

Note: Numbers in parentheses identify the equations as in the text. Equation (*) is derived from equation 11, which is
solved for
and divided by
, and where , represents the tax elasticity of aggregate labor supply.

Given that the taxpayers do not fully account for the marginal benefits of public goods’
provision associated with their labor supply decisions, in the aggregate, the first order condition
of their labor supply decisions will lead to “excessive” leisure in the economy, meaning that the
labor actually supplied would be insufficient to reach the combination of public and private goods
that truly maximizes social welfare.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 4(b). Assuming that labor supply decreases with ,
the traditional measure of MCF is necessarily lower than the negative value of the slope of the
effective budget constraint. Such a situation is found at a point like ET, which represents the
solution for the government problem suggested by the MCF literature. At ET the MCF is equal to
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods for all taxpayers,
which is represented by the slope of the social indifference curve IT. Although feasible, this
solution is not optimal because social welfare can be increased even further.85 The maximum
level of welfare that can be attained is at point EO, where the social indifference curve IO is

Note that the amounts of public and private goods suggested by the MCF rule and described by ET are not
explicitly described in the traditional literature. Indeed, the MCF rule is usually acknowledged as a normative
prescription that applies at the margin, and regardless the absolute amounts of public and private goods.
Paradoxically, even though the traditional normative theory of public expenditures can be used to describe the
optimal size of the public and private sectors, it has remained separated from the normative question of how big the
government should be, and of course also from the (positive) problem of explaining the actual size of the
government.
85
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tangent to the effective budget constraint. If preferences are convex in the relevant range, the
social indifference curve IO represents a greater level of welfare than the one achieved by
applying the MCF rule. Since no further improvement can be made at point EO, it also represents
the optimal solution to the government problem.
In reality, any movement along the effective budget constraint takes place within the leisure- space, and a marginal tax-induced reduction of labor supply leads to a movement
backwards of the - plane. The traditional solution at ET corresponds to the point of tangency
between the taxpayers’ preferences and the effective budget constraint in the -leisure- space.
However, a benevolent and omniscient government would know better because it is, by
definition, fully aware of the benefits associated with the provision of the public good, and it can
also observe how tax revenues change with . In fact, a benevolent and omniscient government
knows that, even though EO is not tangent to the effective budget constraint in the -leisurespace, given the taxpayers’ behavioral responses to taxation the combination of public goods,
leisure, and private goods at EO is feasible and allows the economy to reach a greater level of
social welfare than at ET.
The welfare maximizing first order condition for the government problem, therefore,
describes the point of tangency between the maximum attainable social indifference curve and the
negative value of the slope of the budget constraint:
.
In general,

0(

greater (lower) than one.

(16)

0) implies that the negative value of the slope of the budget constraint is
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First order conditions for welfare maximization

We have shown that the traditional MCF rule does not exploit the fact that the government
generally considers more information about taxpayers’ preferences for public goods than the
taxpayers themselves do in their labor supply decisions. In the following discussion we revisit the
optimal solution to the government problem in terms of the marginal welfare changes induced by
the proportional labor income tax. We show that the effective budget constraint produces an
additional first order condition for welfare maximization that is required to describe the optimal
solution in a second-best framework, and that this is not accounted for by the conventional theory.
We first define the marginal net compensating variation of income,

, as the amount of

non-labor income required by the representative taxpayer in order to keep his welfare level
unchanged after a marginal increase in . The value of

is equal to the marginal welfare costs

of taxation minus the marginal welfare benefits of taxation, and therefore it corresponds to the
negative value of the change in welfare that results from a marginal tax increase.
In order to compute the value of
labor income

for any optimal tax rate we need only to treat non-

as an endogenous variable and solve the conventional government problem of

equation 10.86 Allowing for

to vary with , the modified first order condition for the

government problem can be written as:
1

86

0.

(17)

The assumption about the endogeneity of is made only for mathematical convenience, in order to compute the
compensating marginal effect of on income. In actual fact, non-labor income remains untaxed and its value is
still exogenously determined in the model.
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Using the first order condition for the taxpayer’s decision (equation 4), we can solve for the
marginal net compensating variation of income associated with a movement along the effective
budget constraint:
1
where

,

1

,

,

(18)

is the elasticity of aggregate labor supply with respect to the tax rate on labor income.

Equation 18 suggests that the marginal welfare benefits of taxation decrease with along the
effective budget constraint. At point P0 in Figure 4(b) the labor income tax is equal to zero, thus
there are no public goods in the economy and taxpayers fully spend their income on private
consumption. Since in the vicinity of P0 public goods are scarce the marginal rate of substitution
between public and private goods can safely be expected to be large, such that for a given value of
,

1 the marginal net compensating variation of income is small and plausibly negative.
When increases along the effective budget constraint, however, public goods become

relatively less desirable, reducing the marginal rate of substitution between public and private
goods and with it, the marginal welfare gains of taxation.87 In the vicinity of P0, therefore, we can
expect the proportional labor income taxation to be associated with net welfare benefits, which
will eventually turn into net costs as increases over certain level.
Equation 18 can also be arranged in order to show the value of the sum of marginal rates
of substitution between public and private goods along the effective budget constraint:
.

(19)

The traditional MCF rule for public goods’ provision of equation 13 corresponds to a
particular case of equation 19, defined as the one in which the marginal net compensating

87

In Section 4 we show that under certain plausible conditions , is a decreasing function of , which is also
consistent with a marginal net compensating variation of income that is increasing in .

77
variation of income is equal to zero. This result would imply that the marginal welfare costs of
taxation are identical to the marginal welfare benefits, thus social welfare would be at its
maximum. In a first-best scenario, where no restrictions are imposed on the welfare maximizing
decision, we might expect this result to be correct. However, when taxpayers do not fully account
for the marginal benefits of taxation on their labor responses to taxation they impose a distortion
in the economy that prevents the first-best solution from being attainable. In this context a
benevolent and omniscient government can take advantage of the full information that it enjoys
regarding taxpayers’ preferences in order to maximize social welfare.
As explained, the solution to the government problem is found at the point of tangency
between social preferences and the effective budget constraint, and described by equation 16.
Substituting this expression into equation 17 we find that:
,

(20)

which is a necessary condition for social welfare maximization. Equation 20 represents our point
of departure from the traditional MCF literature, which implicitly assumes that the welfare costs
and benefits of taxation are identical at the second-best solution to the government problem.88
Equation 20 suggests that social welfare is globally maximized as a first-best solution to
the government problem if only if

0, a condition that in turn requires the aggregate labor

supply to be perfectly inelastic with respect to the tax rate. In contrast,

0 would imply that

distortions are present in the economy and that the solution corresponds to a second-best optimum
where the tax elasticity of labor supply is necessarily different from zero. This interpretation of
equation 20 can be considered as a straightforward expression of the Theorem of the Second Best,
which states that “if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which

88

For a complete coverage of the first-best normative public finance theory, see for instance, Tresch (2002).
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prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other conditions, although still
attainable, are, in general, no longer desirable” (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, 11). The constraint
imposed in this case is given by the fact that the taxpayers are not accounting for the marginal
benefits of taxation on their labor supply responses to taxation. In this sense, the traditional MCF
literature is unable to provide an optimal second-best solution to the problem because it does not
recognize that when taxpayers do not account for the marginal benefits of taxation on their labor
supply decisions, they prevent the attainment of the first-best solution to the problem. As a result,
the MCF literature offers a second-best solution that incorrectly satisfies the necessary condition
for a first-best solution.
In Figure 4(b) the solution to the government problem is represented by EO. Using the
taxpayers’ first order condition in equation 4, the (aggregate) optimal marginal net compensating
variation of income,

, is equal to the labor-induced change in disposable income, 1

. In particular, note first that a welfare maximizing government will never choose a
proportional labor income tax rate for which

0. A positive labor response to taxation would

imply that private goods are assigned, at the margin, a greater welfare value than leisure, such that
a reduction of disposable income triggers an increase in labor supply. This necessarily implies
that the marginal welfare loss due to less leisure time available is not valuable enough to offset
the marginal welfare gains from private goods plus the marginal welfare gains from the public
goods financed with the tax increase. As a result, whenever the labor response to taxation is
positive, the optimal government behavior is to increase the labor income tax rate.
In contrast, when

0, equation 20 shows that

is also negative and at the optimal

solution to the government problem must be equal to the labor-induced reduction of disposable
income. This is represented in Figure 4(a) by the area A4. Indeed, at the optimal second-best
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solution to the government problem the welfare gains of more leisure correspond, precisely, to the
marginal net welfare gains of taxation.
Equations 19 and 20 are summarized by equation 16, which is regarded here as the general
first order condition of the government problem and describes the optimal combination of public
goods, leisure, and private goods in the economy. In addition, since the government is restricted
to take the taxpayers’ labor responses to taxation as given, the taxpayers’ first order conditions are
satisfied at any point of the effective budget constraint.
An important implication of equation 20 is that the general equilibrium solution for the
economy dichotomizes into the taxpayers’ time allocation problem and the government’s social
welfare maximization problem. Just as in the traditional allocation problem, taxpayers decide on
their own about the combination of private goods and leisure time that maximizes their individual
welfare. In contrast to the traditional government problem, however, the government can
disregard leisure and exclusively focus on determining the best affordable combination of public
and private goods. In fact, the effective budget constraint as restrictedly defined in the - plane,
summarizes all the relevant constraints faced by a welfare maximizing government.89
Given that equation 20 holds independently of whether distortions exist in the economy,
we can use it in order to simplify the first order condition for the government problem in equation
17. Replacing the value for the optimal change of the net compensating variation of income we
obtain:
1

89

0,

(21)

In this paper we do not consider tax administration costs, but as long as they are a function of the tax rate or the
amount of tax collections we can expect them to affect the shape the shape of the effective budget constraint and the
optimal solution to the government problem. For example, greater tax administration costs would imply that, for any
amount of private consumption , a lower proportion of tax revenues will be available to finance the public good. As
a consequence, the effective budget constraint would shift horizontally towards the left.
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from which the optimal solution to the government problem as described by equation 16 can
readily be obtained. In practical terms, equation 20 implies that the disutility of labor (or the
utility of leisure) is of no consequence to the government decision and, for the purpose of
determining the optimal combination of public and private goods, it can simply be excluded from
the social welfare function. The resulting social welfare maximization problem can therefore be
written as:
max Ω

1

,

.

(22)

The first order condition and the normative prescription for government expenditures are given by
equations 21 and 16, respectively. Note that under this specification

is necessarily equal to

zero, but such a modification in the model does not affect the validity of the solution. The fact
that no welfare change is observed in the solution to the modified government problem of
equation 22 only means that once the optimal solution has been reached, and given the affordable
combinations of public and private goods described by the effective budget constraint, social
welfare is maximized.
In conclusion, the effective budget constraint does not only allow us to ensure that the
optimal solution to the government problem is feasible, but also it allows us to simplify the
formulation of the government problem. The effective budget constraint provides a clear
distinction between the positive and normative dimensions of the government problem. On the
one hand, the positive dimension of the government problem is fully summarized by the effective
budget constraint. On the other hand, the normative dimension continues to be the welfare
maximizing criterion pursued by a benevolent and omniscient government. In turn, any solution
to the government problem can be characterized in terms of a first-best or a second-best solution.
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At the first-best solution the net welfare cost of a proportional labor income tax is equal to zero,
while at the second-best solution this tax instrument must provide a net welfare gain for society.
In this context, it might seem appropriate to redefine the concept of MCF as the slope of
the effective budget constraint; after all, the MCF can be understood to be referring to all the
effective welfare costs associated with the tax collection problem, and the slope of the effective
budget constraint is capable of fully summarizing these costs for any possible solution to the
government problem.

An Application to the Flypaper Effect

Even though the optimal amount of public expenditures is a matter of central concern in the
public finance literature, the available theory is still subject to criticism regarding its practical
applicability and predictive power. In this section we show that the analytical framework
developed in this paper, and under which the traditional second-best solution to the government
problem has been corrected, can also be used to explain actual government behavior. In particular,
we focus on explaining the expenditure decisions of local governments, and show that the secondbest solution to the government problem proposed in this paper can be used to predict the so
called “flypaper effect.” The flypaper effect an observed empirical regularity whereby
intergovernmental (lump-sum) transfers are found to be more stimulative of local government
expenditures than equivalent increases in private income within the jurisdiction.90
Even though the flypaper effect has become a widely accepted phenomenon, it is directly
in conflict with the prediction of the conventional theory about the effect that intergovernmental
90

A recent attempt to explain the flypaper effect with the marginal cost of funds (MCF) is presented in Dahlby
(2009). However, his analysis is based on the traditional definition of the MCF, which in this paper we have shown to
be incomplete.
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transfers “should” have on local public expenditures. The alternative traditional approaches to this
problem usually built their framework upon the median voter model. There is agreement about the
convenience of representing social (or community) preferences by the preferences of a single
decision making body (Bailey and Connolly 1998), and for this purpose, median voter’s
preferences are said to determine the preferences of the government.
Figure 5(a) represents the effects of lump-sum transfers on local expenditures as predicted
by the traditional theory. The initial equilibrium is located at E0, where the optimal amounts of
private consumption

and public expenditures

are defined for a given labor income tax rate

. According to the Equivalence Theorem of Bradford and Oates (1971), lump-sum
intergovernmental transfers have the same allocative effects than equivalent lump-sum payments
to taxpayers. As a consequence, regardless of who is receiving the lump-sum transfers (the
government or the taxpayers) a given amount of lump-sum transfers ( ) can be represented as a
parallel shift from the original budget constraint BC0 to the new budget constraint BC1. The new
equilibrium is found at E1, where the consumption of public and private goods increases as long
as both are normal goods. The tax rate might decrease, increase or remain at the same level,
depending on whether the median voter values private consumption more, less or the same as
public goods.
In practice, however, as already pointed out, the empirical literature has found that such
equivalence does not hold. In the words of Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), “money
sticks where it hits,” because the lump-sum transfers received by local governments have a
greater effect on public expenditures than an identical increase in private income, which tends to
be spent more in private consumption. The flypaper effect phenomenon has for long called the
attention of public finance researchers and several theories have been put forward to explain it.
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One group of theories explain the flypaper effect as specification or measurement errors related
with the econometric analyses; and a second group places the “errors” in the behavior of local
government or on the taxpayers’ themselves. 91 The most accepted explanation is given by the
“fiscal illusion” hypothesis, according to which lump-sum transfers make the median voter, or
taxpayers in general, to misperceive the true marginal costs of public expenditures. 92 In
particular, Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979) propose that under lumpsum transfers to the local government, taxpayers wrongly base their new preferences for public
goods on the lower average cost of local public goods.

Figure 5. The effect of transfers in local government expenditures
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Surveys on the competing explanations about the flypaper effect are found in Hines and Thaler (1995), and Bailey
and Connolly (1998).
92
For a theoretical discussion about the fiscal illusion hypothesis, see Logan (1986), Chu (2003) and Logan and
Shieh (2005).
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This fiscal illusion explanation is, in principle, compatible with the explanation for the
flypaper effect that we offer in this paper. However, our explanation is simpler, in the sense that it
does not require any assumption in addition to the (second-best) optimal solution to the
government problem described in the previous section. In Figure 5(b) we show the effect of lumpsum transfers on local public expenditures. The original equilibrium is, again, represented by E0,
where the optimal amounts of private consumption

and public expenditures

are same as

those in Figure 5(a); however, the original equilibrium in Figure 5(b) corresponds to the point of
tangency between the community preferences (plausibly those of the median voter) and the
effective budget constraint (EBC0).
Lump-sum transfers to the local government shift the effective budget constraint
rightwards to EBC1, and lump-sum transfers to the taxpayers shift the effective budget constraint
upwards to EBC2.93 Moreover, assuming that there is one community indifference curve that is
simultaneously tangent to EBC1 and EBC2, then the new optimal solutions are found at E2 and E3,
respectively. It is easy to verify that lump-sum transfers have different effects on public
expenditures depending on whether they have been received by the government or by the
taxpayers. When transfers are given directly to the local government there are no tax collection
costs for the recipient government, and therefore it is able to reduce the marginal costs of public
expenditures. Such a case would imply that in Figure 5(b) the slope of the effective budget
constraint at E2 is lower than the slope at E0. In contrast, when the same amount of transfers is
given to the taxpayers, the local government must fully face the increasing costs of collecting
taxes, and greater public expenditures would likely be associated with an increase of the marginal

The shape of the effective budget constraints, EBC1 and EBC2, will likely change do to the effect of government
expenditures and private income on labor supply, but for simplicity we assume that the shape of the effective budget
remain identical to the original. This assumption does not change the validity or the generality of the conclusions.
93
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cost of funds (or a greater slope of the effective budget constraint) at E2. 94 In general, contrary to
the Bradford and Oates’ (1971) Equivalence Theorem, the concavity of the effective budget
constraint suggests that the marginal cost of public goods’ provision increases with the tax rate. In
this context, a welfare maximizing government will necessarily account for these variations, and
will tend to increase (decrease) public expenditures when the marginal cost of tax collections
decreases (increases). Indeed, the case portrayed in Figure 5(b) shows that direct transfers to the
local government lead to lower marginal costs than the transfers to the taxpayers, and that the
, is greater than the optimal

optimal amount of public expenditures under the first case,
amount of public expenditures under the second case,

.95

Figure 5(b) shows that the flypaper effect is a straightforward consequence of the fact that
behavioral responses to taxation might likely impose an increasing marginal cost of tax
collections. Similar to the fiscal illusion hypothesis, our explanation for the flypaper effect
suggests that when lump-sum transfers are directly allocated to the local government, economic
agents inside the jurisdiction might underestimate the true marginal costs of public expenditures.
Different from the fiscal illusion hypothesis, however, this result is not due to their “confusion,”
neither to the fact that they consider average instead of marginal costs. Instead, our explanation in
Figure 5(b) suggests that lump-sum transfers to the local government do in fact reduce the
marginal costs inside the jurisdiction.96 In other words, the flypaper effect is the consequence of

94

Of course, there are costs associated with the funds used in the transfer, but those costs are assumed elsewhere,
presumably by the central government that implements the transfer.
95
In addition, Figure 5(b) shows that the optimal amount of private consumption under direct transfers to the local
, is lower than the optimal amount of private consumption under transfers to the taxpayers,
government,
. This result is quite intuitive in the sense that, given a certain level of (local) income, greater government
expenditures offset private consumption. However, note that the amount of (local) income at E2 and E3 are
independent, and ultimately depend on the effect of local government expenditures and lump-sum income increases
on the labor supply, respectively.
96
For instance, Oates (1979) has also suggested that intergovernmental transfers have price effects on government
expenditures, but his arguments are related with production technologies, not with the marginal cost of funds or tax
revenue collections.
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rational and efficient economic behavior inside the jurisdiction. The problem, if there is any, is
not the perception of taxpayers, but instead the effect of intergovernmental transfers on the price
paid inside each jurisdiction for the public goods. In the end, an efficient allocation of
intergovernmental transfers among sub-national governments should take into account the
marginal costs of raising revenues in each jurisdiction and elsewhere in the economy.97
Concluding, the analytical framework developed in this paper allows us to model the
public expenditures’ problem not only from a normative perspective, but also can help explain
actual public expenditures’ decisions. Of course, the fact that we are able to explain the flypaper
effect under our framework does not necessarily “prove” the validity of our framework, but
certainly provides empirical evidence about its applicability. Even more important, the analysis in
this paper suggests that the normative and positive aspects of the government problem do not
need to be analyzed separately, as it has become the traditional practice in the public finance
literature. In principle, the normative and positive approaches to the government problem should
be separated only of the actual government behavior is known not to meet the assumptions of the
normative model, but there are no a priori reasons to claim that this is the case.

Summary and conclusions

In this paper we analyze the problem of determining the optimal amount of public expenditures in
a second-best framework where the only tax instrument available for the government is a
proportional labor income tax. We first introduce the effective budget constraint in order to
summarize the positive restrictions that behavioral responses to taxation impose on the solution to
97

For example, Dahlby and Wilson (1994) argue that “[i]n a federal state, welfare maximization requires the
equalization of the marginal cost of rising revenue across jurisdictions.”
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the government problem. We have shown that the effective budget constraint is likely to be
concave, which would imply that the marginal costs of collecting taxes is increasing along the
range of possible tax rates. By itself, this finding is important because the traditional literature
does not describe the marginal costs of public funds as an increasing function of the tax rate.
Using the effective budget constraint, we also show that the traditional solution to the
government problem in a second-best scenario, represented by the marginal costs of funds (MCF)
rule, does not necessarily maximize welfare. The reason is that this solution is obtained by simply
substituting the taxpayers’ first order conditions into the first order condition of the government
problem, and this procedure does not account for the fact that an omniscient and benevolent
government has additional information about the marginal benefits of public goods’ provision to
taxpayers. The proposed optimal solution to the government problem is found, instead, at the
point of tangency between the highest attainable social indifference curve and the effective budget
constraint.
The second-best solution to the government problem must be represented by a condition
under which the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods is equal
to the slope of the effective budget constraint of the government. Based on this condition, we
propose to redefine the concept of the MCF as the slope of the budget constraint.
We have also shown that the same framework used to describe the second-best solution to
the government problem can be used to explain actual government behavior. In particular, we
show that the flypaper effect may be obtained as a straightforward prediction of the model,
showing its predictive power. This suggests that, contrary to the position taken in the
conventional literature, the normative and positive aspects of the government problem do not
need to be treated separately.
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Appendix I: Variable description and data sources

Variable

Description and sources

Human Development Index
(HDI)

Combines normalized measures of population health and longevity (measured by life
expectancy at birth), knowledge and education (adult literacy rate and a combined
primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio), and standard of living (natural
logarithm of gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity).
Source: United Nations Development Program (UNDP),

Reported Gini

(As defined in User Guide:) Gini as reported by the source (if no Gini were reported by
the source, this will include the Gini as calculated by WIDER or Deininger & Squire for
the old databases using POVCAL, a program estimating the Gini coefficient using
parametric extrapolation).
Source: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database V 2.0a June 2005 (WIID2a)

Fiscal Decentralization

Share of expenditures of all sub-national governments (net of transfers to other levels of
government) in total expenditures of consolidated central budget measured in percents.
Scale from 0 to 100.
Source: Database on Fiscal Indicators, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics.

Log of per capita GDP

Based on per capita real GDP (PPP).
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.2, Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).

Government share of per
capita GDP

Government share of real GDP per capita. Scale from 0 to 100.
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.2, Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).

Population growth

Based on yearly population. Scale in percentage form.
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.2, Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).

Age dependency ratio

Number of dependents over the working-age population.
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005)

Urban population

Urban population over total population. Scale from 0 to 100.
Source: World Development Indicators (2005), by the World Bank.

Average schooling years

Average schooling years in the total population.
Source: Barro, J. Robert and Jong-Wha Lee, 2000.

Index of democracy

POLITY2 is a modified version of the POLITY, which is obtained by subtracting the
value of the scaled value representing AUTOCRATIC (range 0-10) from the value of
DEMOCRATIC (range 0-10) in order to provide a unified polity scale ranging from
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The index has been rescaled to
range between 0 to 100.
Source: Polity IV Project. 2005. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions.
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm

Openness to trade

Openness in constant prices: Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP per capita
(Laspeyres). Scale in percentage form.
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.2, Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).

Log of Population

Based on population (thousands).
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.2, Heston, Summers and Aten (2006).

Ethnic Fractionalization

Probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to
the same ethnic group. Scale in percentage form.
Source: Alesina et al. (2003).
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Appendix II: Descriptive statistics of Poverty determinants’ data

Table II.1:

Sample of countries (and number of observations)

Developing countries

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana
Mauritius
Malawi
Senegal
Swaziland
Uganda
South Africa
Zimbabwe
sub-total observations:
South Asia
Bangladesh
India
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
sub-total observations:
Europe & Central Asia
Hungary
Poland
Middle East & North Africa
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Tunisia
sub-total observations:
East Asia & Pacific
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Thailand
sub-total observations:
Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Paraguay
El Salvador
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
sub-total observations:

182

2
3
4
3
5
3
4
3
27
2
5
5
4
16
5
3
8
5
4
9
5
5
5
5
4
5
29
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
93

Developed countries

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

63
64
65

High income: OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Finland
France
United Kingdom
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Korea, Rep.
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Portugal
Sweden
United States
sub-total observations:
High income: nonOECD
Bahrain
Cyprus
Israel
sub-total observations:

115

5
5
5
5
5
2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
102
5
3
5
13
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Table II.2:

Variable

Summary statistics

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

Human Development Index

overall
between
within

75.2

15.0
15.8
3.3

32.8
34.0
65.2

96.1
92.9
85.7

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Fiscal decentralization (%)

overall
between
within

19.6

15.9
15.7
3.3

1.0
1.3
-0.7

58.8
57.5
39.4

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Government share of per capita GDP

overall
between
within

19.8

6.8
6.4
2.8

7.5
7.9
0.9

48.9
37.9
32.5

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Population growth (%)

overall
between
within

1.6

1.1
1.0
0.4

-0.6
-0.1
-0.4

6.1
3.7
4.0

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Age dependency ratio (%)

overall
between
within

66.5

16.4
16.2
5.4

40.0
45.2
51.5

104.2
103.4
84.7

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Index of democracy

overall
between
within

73.3

33.1
29.2
16.7

0.0
1.6
17.9

100.0
100.0
121.8

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Urban population (%)

overall
between
within

58.3

21.8
22.3
3.5

9.8
11.3
43.5

97.0
96.1
69.2

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Openness to trade

overall
between
within

61.2

37.6
35.3
13.5

9.5
11.6
8.0

213.6
171.3
130.3

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Average schooling years

overall
between
within

6.4

2.7
2.6
0.7

0.9
1.5
4.2

12.2
12.0
8.5

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Ethnic fractionalization

overall
between
within

35.8

23.9
24.4
0.0

0.2
0.2
35.8

93.0
93.0
35.8

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Log of population

overall
between
within

9.5

1.6
1.6
0.1

5.8
6.1
9.2

14.0
13.9
9.8

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6

Log of area (squared kilometers)

overall
between
within

11.5

2.6
2.5
0.0

5.8
5.8
11.5

16.6
16.6
11.5

N=
n=
T-bar =

297
65
4.6
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Appendix III: Descriptive statistics of Inequality determinants’ data

Table III.1:

Sample of countries (and number of observations)

Developing countries

1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Sub-Saharan Africa
Botswana
Mauritius
Uganda
South Africa
sub-total observations:
South Asia
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
sub-total observations:
Europe & Central Asia
Bulgaria
Belarus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
sub-total observations:
East Asia & Pacific
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
sub-total observations:
Latin America & Caribbean
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
sub-total observations:

106

2
3
2
2
9
3
6
9
2
2
2
2
5
2
2
4
3
2
26
3
4
5
4
5
21
4
2
5
3
2
3
2
6
3
2
2
4
3
41

Developed countries

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56

High income: OECD
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Finland
France
United Kingdom
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Korea, Rep.
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Portugal
Sweden
United States
sub-total observations:
High income: nonOECD
Israel

107

4
4
5
7
3
3
5
5
6
7
6
2
5
6
2
6
6
4
5
6
6
103
4
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Table III.2:

Variable

Summary statistics

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

Gini (disposable income)

overall
between
within

34.2

9.0
9.6
2.3

20.0
23.4
28.5

58.9
57.1
40.0

N=
n=
T-bar =

169
45
3.8

Gini (gross income)

overall
between
within

47.6

7.3
7.4
2.5

30.8
34.4
38.5

63.0
61.0
54.9

N=
n=
T-bar =

44
14
3.1

Expenditure decentralization (%)

overall
between
within

23.4

14.9
14.3
2.8

1.3
2.6
9.4

58.8
57.6
33.6

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Government share of per capita GDP

overall
between
within

19.8

6.3
6.8
2.0

4.8
8.1
13.0

41.1
36.8
29.7

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Log of per capita GDP (PPP)

overall
between
within

9.2

0.8
0.8
0.2

6.9
6.9
8.5

10.4
10.2
9.8

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Population growth (%)

overall
between
within

1.0

0.9
1.0
0.3

-1.5
-1.3
-0.1

3.5
3.1
2.1

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Index of democracy

overall
between
within

83.4

26.6
22.3
15.7

5.0
15.0
22.0

100.0
100.0
127.8

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Urban population (%)

overall
between
within

64.5

19.7
19.6
3.0

9.0
11.7
51.5

97.0
96.1
76.6

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Openness to trade

overall
between
within

60.7

36.6
34.7
15.0

9.5
14.6
7.5

213.6
165.6
129.8

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Ethnic fractionalization

overall
between
within

32.7

23.0
23.5
0.0

0.2
0.2
32.7

93.0
93.0
32.7

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Log of population

overall
between
within

9.7

1.4
1.5
0.1

6.8
7.0
9.4

14.0
14.0
10.0

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8

Log of area (squared kilometers)

overall
between
within

11.2

2.6
2.6
0.0

4.1
4.1
11.2

16.0
16.0
11.2

N=
n=
T-bar =

213
56
3.8
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Appendix IV: Proof of equation 8

The slope of the effective budget constraint
1

where

as defined in equation 7 is:

.
and thus

. The derivative of

with respect to is equal to:

2
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2

1

2
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2
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result that is displayed in equation 8.
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